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Abstract 
This paper uses the genealogical records of 35,691 men to test one of the 
fundamental assumptions of the Malthusian model. Did higher living standards 
result in increased net reproduction? An empirical investigation of China between 
1400 and 1900 finds a positive relationship between social status and fertility. The 
gentry scholars, the Confucians, produced three times as many sons as the 
commoners, and this status effect on fertility was stronger in the post-1600 period 
than in the pre-1600 period. The effect disappears once I control for the number of 
marriages. Increased marriages among upper-class males drove reproductive 
success in Imperial China. The results add a demographic perspective to explain 
the lack of modern economic growth in Imperial China.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
Since the time of Malthus (1798), economic historians have long been preoccupied 
with the relationship between economic growth and population growth. One of the 
fundamental assumptions behind the unified growth theory is that improved 
living standards lead to faster population growth. In the Malthusian epoch, 
income increase leads to fertility increase and mortality decrease; thus, improved 
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living standards lead to higher net reproduction. The growing proportion of the 
rich, together with a quantity-quality trade-off of children, led to the increase of 
human capital and finally triggered the fertility transition and modern economic 
growth (Galor and Moav 2002; Galor and Weil 2000; Willis 1973; Becker et al., 
1990; Galor 2012). 
 
Empirical evidence from pre-modern England supports this reasoning. Clark and 
Hamilton (2006) analyse more than 2,000 wills in England in 1585-1638, and find 
a “survival of the richest” story, that the number of descendants of the richest 
testators was twice that of the poorest. Boberg-Fazlic et al. (2011) also find a 
positive relationship between social class and fertility in the family reconstitution 
dataset of England constructed by Wrigley et al. (1997). However, after including 
the rates of childlessness and celibacy, de la Croix et al. (2019) find that the same 
dataset suggests a somewhat different story –it was the middle class, rather than 
the rich, that had the highest reproduction rate. In addition to the evidence from 
England, a study by Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013) also shows a positive link 
between income and reproduction in colonial India. 
 
The positive correlation between living standards and fertility has also changed 
over history (Skirbekk 2008; Cummins 2009). After extending the English probate 
data to cover a more extended period starting in the sixteenth century, Clark and 
Cummins (2015) reveal that the higher net fertility of the rich did not remain 
stable over the entire pre-transitional period: a rapid decline in net fertility 
occurred first in the middle and upper classes as early as 1780, and the lower class 
gradually caught up with the fertility level of the rich. 
 
While scholars have worked on macro-population trends in the same period for the 
Chinese context (Ho 1959; Perkins 1969), there has been little research examining 
the socio-economic factors that affecting individual fertility. Two demographic 
studies, Harrell (1985) and Telford (1995), first examine the rate of population 
growth across generations at the household level by using genealogical data and 
observe much higher rates in wealthy segments than in poor ones in the same 
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lineage. Shiue (2017) also explores genealogies in Anhui Province to test the child 
quantity-quality trade-off in Ming-Qing China and finds a negative relationship 
between education and fertility before the nineteenth century and its 
disappearance during the late Qing period. Chen, Lee, and Campbell (2010) study 
the reproduction of the Manchu Bannermen in Shuangcheng, a rural county in 
Liaoning Province in northeast China in 1866 to 1907 and reveal a positive 
relationship between landed estates and reproduction, but an uncertain 
occupation-reproduction relationship. Another study by Song, Campbell, and Lee 
(2015) analyse the farming population in Liaoning and also the population from 
the imperial lineage from 1725 to 1875 and finds that patrilineages with high-
status founders could survive longer than the one with low-status founders. 
Similarly, Che and Cao (2011; 2014) use genealogical records and land contracts 
of the Que lineage in Zhejiang Province after 1700 to test the effects of 
landholdings on fertility and conclude the same.  
 
Apart from these works, however, scholars have not rigorously studied status 
differences in China’s fertility patterns. This paper uses a range of quantitative 
tools to explore the relationship between living standards and fertility on a new 
dataset comprised of Chinese genealogies, which contains 35,691 males from six 
lineages between 1400 and 1900. This paper uses seven levels of social status to 
capture the relative differences in living standards, and the number of sons who 
survived infancy as a measure for net fertility as boys were the only children 
recorded officially in China for centuries. It finds a positive status-fertility 
relationship in Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) China, providing evidence 
in the Chinese context to support “survival of the richest”.  
 
The results demonstrate in the six lineages a positive association between social 
status and net fertility: climbing up the social ladder would increase the number 
of sons a male produced. Considering the changes in net reproduction and social 
status over the five centuries, in the baseline regression, the only control variable 
included is the birth cohort fixed effect. The unconditional status-fertility 
relationship shows that an elite in the highest rank in the sample (rank 7) could 
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be expected to have three times as many sons as a commoner (rank 1). The positive 
feedback is still significant after conditioning on other individual-level factors that 
could affect male reproduction, including human capital, birth order, survival to 
adulthood, out-migration, birth cohort, and lineage fixed effects. Controlling 
further for the number of marriages a male had, however, reduces all the fertility 
gradients. Males in ranks 2 and 4 (the lower “high social status” males) retain 
their advantages in reproduction, but promotion from rank 1 to ranks 2 and 4 
could only bring about an increase of about fifteen per cent in net fertility; the net 
fertility of males of ranks 5-7, the higher “high social status” males, is no different 
from that of commoners. The weakened social status effect suggests that the 
number of marriages is a key mechanism through which social status impacted on 
the number of sons.  
 
I then move to analyse the key mechanism, the number of marriages. High social 
status males, in general, had more marriages over their lifetime than the 
commoners. A rank 2 man had 32 per cent more marriages than a commoner, and 
a rank 7 man had 77 per cent more. Moreover, the social status effects on 
marriages were different in lineages with a low proportion of gentry-scholars and 
ones with a high proportion of gentry-scholars. 
 
I go on below to argue that although the Chinese elites, the Confucians, could 
produce more surviving descendants than the commoners could, the type of 
education and human capital not only impeded a transition to modern economic 
growth in the late Qing period, but indeed reinforced the existing social and 
economic structure.  
 
This paper is the first attempt to show the social gradients in fertility in China 
from 1400 to 1900. The two works by Lee, Campbell, and their co-authors (Chen 
et al. 2010; Song et al. 2015) both touch upon the similar research question. 
However, the periods they cover are in mid-Qing and late-Qing, and their sample 
populations are also quite different from the common population resided in China 
Proper. Besides, Chen et al. (2010) focuses more on the impacts of landholdings, 
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rather than social status, on reproduction. Shiue (2016; 2017) uses genealogical 
records to demonstrate the historical fertility in China too, but what she shows is 
an intergenerational relationship between parental fertility and child outcome, 
rather than the status-fertility relationship within the same generation.  
 
Besides, my research also examines the number of marriages as a critical 
intermediary variable that links social status and reproduction in an unequal 
society. Previous studies use the number of marriages as a measure for social 
status, and men married more than once were assigned to a higher social status 
compared to men who did not (Telford 1995, p.92, Appendix 3.A; Shiue 2019, Table 
1). However, the number of marriages was more of a proxy for wealth than a proxy 
for social status. Remarrying and having concubines required considerable wealth, 
but wealth cannot define social status in Ming-Qing China. High social status 
could bring a man more wealth and thus more marriages, but having more 
marriages alone did not mean that he was high in social status. Therefore, 
including the number of marriages into the classification of social status could be 
misleading, and this research examines it separately.  
 
Finally, this paper showcases a new dataset for anyone interested in 
understanding demographic trends in China and the potential of genealogical data 
in economic history research. My research inserts China into the discussion about 
modern economic growth theories. Since many previous studies have portrayed 
imperial Chinese society as contrasting with that of the pre-modern Western 
European states, 1  a more in-depth look at the evolution of Chinese micro-
demography in this paper suggests that China did possess similar pre-conditions 
as Western Europe did. Furthermore, such finding also sheds light from a new 
demographic perspective on the Great Divergence between China and Europe. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the historical 
context of social stratification and the culture of keeping genealogies in imperial 
China. Section 3 and 4 outline the genealogical data used, and the methodology 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Malthus 1798, and Voigtländer and Voth 2013. 
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employed in the empirical research. Section 5 presents the results, the 
relationship between net fertility and social status, and section 6 reports the 
robustness of the results. Section 7 discusses the findings, and Section 8 concludes.  
 
 
2 Historical context and background 
2.1 Social stratification in imperial China 
The traditional way to describe the social hierarchy of imperial China is to refer 
to the occupation structure of the time. The male population was divided into two 
main classes, the elite class (gentry-scholars) and the commoner class (peasants, 
artisans, and merchants). For a Chinese man in the Ming and Qing dynasties, 
being blue-blooded would be lucky, but even if he was not, he could join the nobility 
by passing the keju exams.  
 
Keju (Chinese imperial examination system) was one of the most long-standing 
national civil service examination systems in the world. The system was initiated 
around 600 A.D. and abolished at the end of the Qing dynasty, in the year of 1905.2 
As Elman (2000, p.14) points out, the exam redefined the “Shih” (the gentry-
scholar class), changing it from “men of good birth to men of culture”. It 
transformed China into a meritocracy (Campbell and Lee 2003); a man from an 
ordinary or even impoverished family had as good a chance as an aristocrat to take 
the exam and enter the state bureaucracy. However, this meritocracy was also 
unique, since “merit” was defined as mastery of the Confucian classics, rather than 
of administrative and management skills (Mokyr 2016, p. 303).3 
 
This system had three levels of exams and three corresponding academic degrees. 
A pass at the lowest – county or prefectural level would earn one the degree of a 
                                                     
2 Some kinds of civil service exams were set as early as the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), but the 
candidates who could take them were mostly relatives of the royal families. It was not until the 
Sui dynasty that the commoners were allowed to take them.  
3 See Elman (1994, pp.114-121) for the formats of the exam during the Ming and Qing dynasties. 
The format has changed only slightly during the two dynasties, and the central part of the exam 
was always writing essays based on the quotations from the Confucian classics (“Four Books and 
Five Classics”).  
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shengyuan. After qualifying with another exam, a shengyuan could then take the 
provincial-level exam, and if successful would become a juren. The juren from all 
over the country would be eligible to travel to the capital city for the national-level 
exam, in which the outstanding performers would be awarded the jinshi degree.4 
As Ho puts it (1962, pp. 26-27), becoming a jinshi “automatically placed a person 
in the middle stratum of the officialdom”, and earning the intermediate juren 
degree “entitled a person to an eventual minor official appointment”.  
 
Only a small fraction of the many shengyuan could pass at the provincial level and 
the final national level of the exam. 5A shengyuan degree could not substantially 
change a commoner’s life, but the two higher degrees could. Being a juren or a 
jinshi brought the degree holder not only a position in the government, but it also 
granted many other kinds of benefits and advantages.6  
 
2.2 The history of keeping genealogies in China 
“Genealogy is the written record of family or lineage members descended from a 
common ancestor or ancestors” (Zhao 2001). The origins of keeping genealogies 
can be traced back to the time of the Six Dynasties (222-589 A.D.). During this 
period, only noble families, that is, families related to a royal family, could be 
recognized as “lineages” and were qualified to keep a genealogical record. However, 
after the collapse of most of these lineages in the Tang-Song transition period 
(c.900-1000 A.D.), forming lineages and keeping genealogies were not the 
privileges of the noble class anymore. In Ming and Qing China, lineages evolved 
into the “fundamental organizing constructs in Chinese society”, and compiling 
genealogical books became widespread among commoners, and was particularly 
prevalent in Southeast China (Zelin 2009, p. 626; Feng 2009; Feng and Chang 
2001).  
                                                     
4 See Miyazaki (1981) for a more detailed introduction to the keju.  
5 Chen, Kung, and Ma (2018) calculate the passing rates of the exams and find that “at each 
exam about 1,241 juren would be selected out of 20,600 shengyuan, and about 220 jinshi would 
be selected out of 1,250 juren”. 
6 A famous story about Fan Jin, a man who lived during the Ming dynasty, clearly presents the big 
changes in economic and social status that a juren degree could bring to the poor. After receiving 
the juren degree, Fan was immediately offered large houses and lands by local officials and 
merchants who wished to gain his protection (Ho 1962, pp.42-43). 
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3 Data 
3.1 The sample: Genealogical books of six Chinese lineages 
To study Chinese demographic history, genealogy is a valuable source. Telford 
(1986) estimates that more than 10,000 clan genealogies survive in China, but 
scholars have only studied a small part of them.7 In Shiue’s three recent works 
(2016; 2017; 2019), she exploits the genealogical data of several lineages in 
Tongcheng County, Anhui Province, Southeast China. In this paper, I also focus 
on Southeast China, but two neighbouring provinces of Anhui, Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu.  
 
I transcribe and construct a sample containing detailed individual information 
about three common lineages (i.e., families with a low proportion of scholars and 
officials), and three elite lineages (i.e., families with a high proportion of high-
ranking officials) from 1400 to 1900.8 The three common lineages, Huang, Zhou, 
and Que, are all located in Songyang County, Chuzhou Prefecture, in the southern 
part of Zhejiang. Of the three elite lineages, the Zha is from Haining County, 
Jiaxing, in north Zhejiang, while the other two are both located in south Jiangsu. 
They are the Gu of Suzhou, with 80 branches settled in six different counties in 
Suzhou,9 and the Zhuang of Wujin County, Changzhou (Figure 1 shows the two 
provinces and four prefectures).  
 
The genealogies of the six lineages contain 96 volumes of genealogical books. 10 
The genealogical books record, in chronological order, the names of each of the 
                                                     
7 Harrell (1985) and Harrell and Pullum (1995) examine the demography by using genealogical 
records of lineages in Xiaoshan County also in Zhejiang Province. Liu (1981, 1985) mainly studies 
the lineage genealogies of the Lower Yangzi region, Jiangsu and Zhejiang Province. Telford (1990; 
1992) studies lineages in Tongcheng County in Anhui Province. Peng and Hou (1996) study the 
long-term trend of demographic changes in the Fan Lineage in Jiangsu Province from 1370 to 1900. 
Lee et al. (1993, 1994) enquire into the Qing imperial lineages, revealing the life pattern of the 
Qing nobles in the late imperial era. 
8 Che and Cao (2011; 2014) use genealogical records of two branches in the Que lineage after 
1700 to test the population pressure and economic shocks in the lineage. I thank their kindness 
for sharing the data of these two branches with me. 
9 The six counties are Taicang, Changshu, Chongming, Kunshan, Wushan, and Wuxi.  
10 A genealogical book always includes the following sections: an introduction giving the history of 
the family, the rules of compilation, the rules and regulations that family members need to follow, 
the contributions of some prominent figures in the family, a family tree which includes all the male 
members recorded in the book, and finally a detailed entry for each male descendant in the family. 
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male members of the lineage, with his corresponding mini-biography (see Figure 
A1 in Appendix A). Each such mini-biography tells us the male’s name(s), position 
among his brothers, birth and death dates, academic degrees and honours, the 
wives’ and concubines’ surnames, birth and death dates, and, most importantly, 
the number of children he sired. Not all the entries, however, contain all the above 
information: Appendix Table A1 shows the number of individuals who have both 
birth and death years recorded. 
 
Fig. 1 Map of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, China in 1820. 
 
Source: CHGIS 2007. 
 
A total of 37,622 male mini-biographies appeared in these 96 volumes of 
genealogical books. Records of all six lineages start before 1400. Since this paper 
studies the Ming and Qing dynasties, I exclude from the sample males born before 
1350 and after 1920. Besides, as the time of the last compiling of the Huang, Gu, 
and Zhuang genealogies was before 1900, I eliminate males from the last several 
generations whose fertility records are incomplete in the three lineages. My 
criterion is also whether the compilers recorded the mini-biography as an 
incomplete one or not. If the compilers were unable to record accurate details, 
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especially information on the number of sons, they would mark all these mini-
biographies with the phrase “failed to trace the information” (失修 or 失考). After 
this process of elimination, the sample contains information on 35,691 males in  
 
Of the 35,691 males, 22,685 have explicit birth year records. With these records, I 
can impute an approximate birth cohort for the relatives of these males who have 
no birth year recorded. Finally, I managed to classify 34,140 males into seven birth 
cohorts, starting with a “pre-1400” interval, ending with a “post-1900” interval, 
and with five century-long intervals in between.  
 
3.2 The common and the elite lineages 
As noted above, I classify the six lineages into two groups, common lineages and 
elite lineages. The main criterion for distinguishing the two types of family is the 
number and proportion of “scholar-officials” in the families. Under the strict social 
class structure of imperial China, more juren, jingshi, and officials within a 
lineage represented more wealth and higher social status for the lineage (Ho 1962; 
Elman 2000). Table 1 shows the different proportions of degree holders in the six 
lineages. More than ten percent of males in the Zha and Zhuang lineages were 
degree holders.11    
 
The Gu lineage is exceptional. Historically speaking, as claimed by Hao and Clark 
(2012), the surname Gu was one of the “aristocratic surnames of great antiquity” 
and was also one of the “big three” regional elite surnames in the Lower Yangzi 
region. Its earliest recorded ancestor, Yewang Gu, was born in 519 A.D. in Suzhou. 
Although the proportion of the degree holders is relatively low, the twenty-two 
generations of male population show thirty-one holders of high degrees. 
Furthermore, its long span of genealogies alone is enough to demonstrate its 
“eliteness”. 
                                                     
11 In Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Ch'ang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late 
Imperial China, Benjamin Elman focuses on two elite lineages in Changzhou, one being the 
Zhuang lineage. For more of the history and the rise of the Zhuang lineage, see Elman 1990, 
Chapter 2. 
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Table 1 Degree Holders in the Six Lineages 
Lineage Generation High Medium  Low Total 
% of total 
male 
population 
Huang 1st-17th 0 0 4 4 0.3% 
Que 1st-25th 2 108 41 151 1.7% 
Zhou 1st-28th 0 15 22 37 3.5% 
Gu 17th-38th 31 101 41 173 1.0% 
Zha 1st-20th 64 297 231 592 11.7% 
Zhuang 1st-20th 89 293 127 509 11.1% 
 
Note: High degree holders include jinshi, juren, and gongsheng, medium degree holders include 
guoxuesheng, taixuesheng, lingsheng, fusheng, and zengsheng, and low degree holders include 
xiangsheng and yisheng. 
 
3.3 Status records in the genealogical books 
As noted previously, and also emphasized by Ho (1962, p.40), social status in 
imperial China was primarily determined not by the usual determinants of a 
man’s status in European societies, such as inherited wealth and landed estates, 
but by academic degrees earned through keju exams.  
 
Detailed keju results in the genealogy of every lineage make comparisons between 
lineages possible. Incorporating information from studies on keju and social 
stratification in imperial China (Ho 1953, Chapter I; Chen, Kung and Ma 2018; 
Telford 1995, p.92, Appendix 3A) and also status descriptions in genealogical 
records, Table 2 lists a detailed classification of the social levels cited in this 
paper.12 
 
Based on the hierarchy of keju and also the bureaucratic system in Ming and Qing 
China, the classification includes three broad classes and seven social ranks. Both 
the non-gentry and the near-gentry classes include males without an academic 
                                                     
12 One of the concerns regarding the status records in the genealogies is that the compilers might 
incline to exaggerate the status records of their family members. Thanks to the hard work of Lee-
Campbell research group (Ren, Chen, Hao, Campbell, and Lee, 2016), I have managed to match 
thirty-one officials from the Zha lineage to the Jin Shen Lu (缙绅录, Qing China Government 
Employee Records). I found their records of official positions in the two types of sources are the 
same, proving that the status records in the genealogies are reliable. 
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degree, but the near-gentry males, at least, had other non-keju status indicators. 
The “gentry” group includes all the degree holders and males who managed to 
attain official positions. Ranks 3 and 4 represent all the lower degree holders who 
failed to obtain office after earning the degree. They are the lower-class males in 
the gentry group. A male from rank 5 could be a lowest-ranking employee in the 
bureaucratic system, a prospective official who was in the waiting list for an 
official position, or a middle-class gentry-scholar who failed to obtain office. Ranks 
6 and 7 denote the upper-class gentry-scholars. I consider males in the near-gentry 
and the gentry groups (ranks 2-7) as “Confucians” in the present paper. 
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Table 2 Classification of Social Ranks 
Rank Description 
Non-gentry 
1 No status 
1 Honoured by later generations with poems or discourses  
Near-gentry 
2 
Literate and educated but without a degree (teacher in the 
village school or editor of genealogical books) 
2 Lineage chief; donor to the lineage and the county 
2 Given an award by the emperor for having Confucian virtues  
Gentry  
3 Lower degree holder (Normal shengyuan) 
4 
Students at the Imperial Academy (taixuesheng, 
guoxuesheng); civil shengyuan (lingsheng, zengsheng, 
jiansheng) 
5 Clerks (wei’ruliu); prospective officials (houbu, houxuan) 
5 
Intermediate degree holders (juren, gongsheng), but without 
official position  
6 
Low-ranking civil official (bureaucratic strata 8 and 9), lower 
degree, or inherited/purchased degree holder 
6 
Intermediate degree holder, with an official position; 
medium-ranking local official (bureaucratic strata 4 to 7); 
low-ranking court official 
7 
Higher degree holder (jinshi); high-ranking local official 
(bureaucratic strata 1 to 3); medium-ranking court official  
7 High-ranking court official; jinshi with an official position  
7 
Top-level post in the state bureaucracy (Hanlin Academy, Six 
Central Boards, etc.) 
 
Source: Ho 1953, Chapter 1; Telford 1995, p.92, Appendix 3A; Shiue 2017, p. 364, Table 1. 
Note: There were nine main ranks in the bureaucracy of Ming and Qing China, the lowest being 
the ninth and the highest the first. Ho (1962, pp.24-46) divides the nine ranks into three strata. 
The highest stratum included officials of the first, second, and third ranks; the middle stratum 
consisted of all the officials from the fourth rank to the seventh rank; and the lowest stratum were 
officials of the eighth and ninth ranks. 
 
 
4 Methodology 
Here I describe the empirical methods used in this analysis. Given that the 
outcome of interest is an over-dispersed count variable (mean = 1.132, variance = 
1.843), I chose first to use the methods of ordinary least squares (OLS), Poisson 
regression and negative binomial regression based on: 
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𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛾𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 ,         (1) 
 
where S is the recorded number of sons that a male produced, i denotes male 
individuals, α is the constant, and Rank is a set of categorical variables ranging 
from 1 to 7 that measure the male’s social ranks as expressed in Table 2. Marriage 
is the total number of marriages the male had, including both marriages in 
sequence (wives non-concurrently) and concurrent marriages (wives and 
concubines at the same time). W denotes the independent variables that would be 
successively controlled for, including the male’s human capital, whether he was 
the first son or the only son in his family, whether he migrated out of his village, 
or survived to adulthood, his birth cohort, and the lineage that he belonged to. 𝛽 
represents the set of respective coefficients for these variables. 𝜀 is the error term. 
 
Table A2 in Appendix A presents the summary statistics of the variables. Figure 
2 shows the distribution of observations of each social rank in the six lineages and 
the distribution of observations of each social rank over time. 13  Section 4.1 
discusses the description of all the variables and reasons for controlling them.  
 
Fig. 2 Rank Distribution by Lineage and Cohort 
 
Notes: 1. See detailed rank description in Table 2. 2. See the accurate number of males of each 
social rank in the six lineages in Table A3a, and the number of males of each social rank over time 
in Table A3b.  
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
                                                     
13 See also Table A4 in Appendix A for the distribution of lineage by sub-period. 
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4.1 Description of variables 
Number of sons. This is the dependent variable in the model. I used the recorded 
number of sons per married male, which equals the number of sons who survived 
infancy, to measure net reproduction.  
 
The two main reasons for this choice are as follows. On the one hand, that 
daughters, and sons who died in infancy are under-recorded in genealogical 
books.14  On the other, Clark and Cummins (2015) employ this kind of male-
relative fertility measure to examine fertility in England by using probate records. 
Though it differs from the conventional female-relative fertility measures, as they 
point out, “there is no conceptual reason not to treat this measure of fertility as a 
valid measure of long-run fertility changes” (Clark and Cummins 2015). In this 
paper, I also consider net fertility in terms of sons who survived infancy a valid 
measure to show overall fertility, and the relative differences between lineages 
and between social ranks in the long run.  
 
Social ranks. Social status is the key variable in the model. The classification of 
social ranks applied in this paper is presented in Table 2.  
 
Number of marriages. The marriage system in imperial China was complicated 
and different to practices in the West. It was a system between monogamy and 
polygamy where men were officially only allowed to have one wife at a time 
however they could also have multiple concubines at the same time.  Whilst 
concubines were inferior to wife in status, their children were considered 
legitimate and therefore have been recorded in the genealogies. Still, the data 
suggests having concubines was more of an upper-class privilege than universal 
practice. In my lineage sample, 3,020 males (about 8.46 per cent of the total) 
married more than once, and only 502 of them had concubines (where the wives of 
the remaining 2,518 men were the result of consecutive marriages).15  
                                                     
14 I will also discuss the omission of daughters and infant deaths in more detail in Section 4.3. 
15 This proportion of remarriage is comparable to the findings from the previous genealogical 
studies. In Liu (1995, p. 105, Table 4.3), she reports the proportion of remarried men in five 
lineages in South China, which ranged from 8.4% to 26.1%. In Telford’s sample of 8,295 males in 
16 
 
The number of marriages is treated as a continuous predictor because the main 
incentive for Chinese men to have one more marriage was to produce more sons. 
Hence, every one-unit change in the number of marriages should bring the same 
amount of change in the number of sons. However, as a robustness check, I also 
show results by treating the number of marriages as an ordinal variable in Section 
6.4. 
 
Zi and Hao. I use the two dummies to proxy for human capital and educational 
attainment, neither of which can be fully captured by the keju-related social rank 
variable. Zi (字, courtesy name) and hao (号, pen name) are two types of particular 
name that show respect and a higher level of literacy; they were used widely 
among literate people in traditional China. Males were given zi by their fathers or 
their teachers when they turned twenty years old. Hao was the pen name that a 
highly educated male would give himself and always used when he was writing in 
either prose or poetry. Given the cost of education, we would also assume that 
males who had both zi and hao were from wealthier families than males who had 
one or neither. 
 
First-born. Following traditional Chinese practice, the birth order of a male could 
also affect his net fertility. However, since the birth status of the individual vis-à-
vis his brothers is naturally related to the size of his family of origin, it is difficult 
to control for it without any adjustment.16 Given that a first-born son is usually 
expected to take greater responsibility in family events and maintaining the 
patriline than his younger brothers do, I use the First-born dummy to indicate 
whether the male is the first-born (or the only) son in his family of origin.17  
                                                     
Tongcheng County (1992, p.27, Table 2), 580 (6.99%) of them had more than one wife. Since Telford 
used no “elite lineages” in this study, he predictably found a relatively low proportion of 
remarriages.  
16  Many studies have explored the relationship between birth order, health outcomes and 
educational attainment (Booth and Kee 2009; Hatton and Martin 2010). Booth and Kee (2009) also 
construct a birth order index to deal with the issue generated from the correlated birth order and 
family size. Since birth order is not the critical predictor variable studied in this paper, I do not 
apply this index. 
17 Such “demographic privilege” enjoyed by the first-born has been demonstrated by Lee and 
Campbell (1997, pp.138-139) in northeast China; Li and Zhen (2015) also show this in their study 
of the family division records of the Que lineage.  
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Out-migration. Out-migration is a dummy used to control for a possible omission 
of information because the individual concerned was away from home. It equals 
one if the individual was out of the village and never came back, if he decided to 
become a monk, or if he was removed from the lineage due to disobedience to 
family rules. In these cases, genealogy compilers were unable to acquire updated 
information, or they had to eliminate the initially recorded information, which 
caused an inevitable gap between the actual number of sons and the recorded 
number of sons of these males. 
 
Survival to adulthood. Lifespan beyond doubt affects fertility. However, since less 
than one-third of the males in the genealogies had a complete set of vital statistics, 
most of the sample had a lifespan that cannot be conjectured. However, males who 
failed to survive to adulthood (twenty sui, which is approximately equivalent to 
nineteen years old) are specially marked with such words as shang, yao, youzu, 
zaozu, zaoshi in their mini-biographies.18 I use the variable Survival to adulthood 
to control for the strong negative impact of a short lifespan on fertility.  
 
Birth cohort. I control for the time fixed effects on net reproduction and social 
ranks by including a set of century-long periods in the model.19 I group the males 
into seven birth cohorts as discussed in Section 3.1.  
 
                                                     
18 Shang (殇) and yao (夭) denote the death of children who died between one and four years old; 
youzu (幼卒)   refers to children who died under the age of eight sui (six to seven years old). Zaozu 
(早卒) and zaoshi (早逝) mean that the individual died young between the ages of fifteen and twenty 
sui (around thirteen to nineteen years old).  
19 Despite the consistency of keju in the two dynasties, the achieved degrees were not of the same 
value. For instance, the Ming court first started to publicly sell studentships of the National 
Academy, namely gongsheng or jiansheng, which had the same currency as the intermediate 
degree, juren degree. However, by the late Qing dynasty, the degree had lost much of its value, 
given the significant increase in the total number of the jiansheng degree holders. Mainly after 
Qianlong’s reign, the quota of the jiansheng degree expanded dramatically. In the local gazettes of 
Huizhou prefecture, a place which is well-known for its successful Huizhou merchants, “almost all 
of the numerous biographical sketches of local tradesmen who donated to local philanthropy are 
prefaced by the term chien-sheng [jiansheng]” in the Qing dynasty (Ho 1962, p.34). 
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Lineage. Because of the varying amounts of resources that common lineages and 
elite lineages could access, along with some other family-related biological and 
cultural characteristics, lineage fixed effects are also included.  
 
4.2 An excess of men without heirs 
As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4a, many men in the genealogies had net sons of 
zero. 44.11 per cent of males, most of them were from the rank 1 group in the 
sample, failed to produce any son.20 Because a negative binomial model would 
underestimate the number of zeros, I also considered a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model to deal with the issue.  
 
Fig. 3 Distribution of the Recorded Number of Sons. 
 
 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 Many of these men could have un-recorded daughters, so the proportion of childless men would 
be less than 44.11 per cent. 
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Fig. 4a Proportion of the Heirless by Rank. 
 
 
 
Note: 1. The value in each bar shows the mean number of sons by rank. 2. See Appendix Table 
A6a for detailed number at each rank.  
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
Theories of zero-inflated models suggest that the excessive zero counts originate 
from two processes – one “always zero” process, which cannot be predicted by a 
Poisson or a negative binomial model and one usual process (see, for example, 
Lambert 1992; Greene 1994; 2018, p.905). The number of zeros could be inflated 
in the dependent variable through the former process and would be disguised as 
over-dispersion; thus it is important to differentiate the two processes.  
 
In the present paper, the two different processes that lead to the dependent 
variable value of zero are that the male had no wife and thus no sons, or the male 
had one or several wives but still produced no son. The former male was certain 
to have had no sons, but the latter could have had at least one son. The two 
different processes should be distinguished in this research.  
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Fig. 4b Proportion of the Unmarried by Rank. 
 
 
Note: 1. The value in each bar shows the mean number of marriages by rank. 2. See Appendix 
Table A6b for detailed number at each rank.  
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
As Figure 4b shows, the high proportion of men without heirs is primarily due to 
bachelorhood. 29.60% of the males in the sample remained single all their lives; 
most of them were commoners. For males of the near-gentry and gentry classes, 
the average number of marriages is greater than one, and all the rank 7 males 
succeeded in marrying at least once. Since Chinese genealogical books record only 
legitimate births, sons of unmarried males are not recorded. 21  Of the 25,125 
married males, 5,181 (20.62%) of them produced no sons. 22  I also report the 
proportions of unmarried and heirless males by lineage in Table A5 of  
Appendix A. 
 
                                                     
21 The illegitimate births (out-of-wedlock births) were rare in China. Lee and Wang (1999, p. 88, 
p.161, and p. 188) mention that the share of illegitimate births was nearly zero in the historical 
population of China. There was the existence of bastardy, as shown in Sommer (2015), but only in 
the extremely impoverished population. 
22 The percentage of fathers without heirs in the Tongcheng lineages studied by Telford (1995, 
pp.76-77, Tables 3.2 and 3.5) and in five Southeast Chinese lineages studied by Liu (1995, pp.102-
105, Table 4.3) are all around 20%. Again, the percentage of childless married men would be less, 
because of the issue of missing daughters in the genealogies.  
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Therefore, in the zero-inflated negative binomial model applied in this paper, I use 
the number of marriages as the predictor to distinguish the two types of zero 
outcomes. The zero counts generated by the unmarried males belong to the 
“always zero” group, and the zero counts generated by the married males belong 
to the “not always zero” group.  
 
4.3 Selection biases 
As previously discussed in Section 2.2, although keeping genealogies was not a 
privilege for the elites in the Ming and Qing dynasties, and was remarkably 
widespread in Southeast China, not every single Chinese family would indeed 
keep genealogies, and the wealthier and higher-social-status families were more 
inclined to keep genealogies than the ordinary families. Therefore, the commoners 
in the sample still could have higher social status compared to the “real” 
commoners in society. This potential selection bias, however, could not affect my 
results. Even with a potentially higher-social-status commoner group in the 
sample, I still find a positive status-fertility relationship, then comparing the net 
reproduction of a high-ranking male to that of a “real” commoner could only find 
a more considerable difference than what I can find in the research, which proves 
that my results are robust to this bias. 
 
In terms of the quality of the data, the continuing editing and compiling of 
genealogies ensure the reliability. Every lineage formulates clear rules for 
compiling genealogies; one common rule is that family members should compile 
the genealogy every sixty years (or every three to five generations). As Table A1 
shows, the interval between two large-scale compilations of the six lineages is on 
average shorter than sixty years. During the interval, family members would 
record all the changes in the lineage in handwritten caopu (草谱, draft books). Yet, 
as Harrell (1995, p.5) points out, “…genealogies are compiled for ritual rather than 
demographic reasons”; hence, the voluntary selection in genealogies could bias the 
test towards finding spurious fertility gradients. Shiue (2016), however, examines 
the genealogy sample of Tongcheng County and finds no severe biases. This 
section investigates selection biases in my lineage sample of the six lineages. 
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One inevitable bias of Chinese genealogies is the omission of daughters and 
children who died in infancy.23 Many genealogical studies have already shown 
that the inclusion of individuals in the genealogies was mainly from ritualistic 
considerations (Harrell 1995; Telford 1986; Shiue 2016). In traditional Chinese 
culture, all men were ritualistically significant, and so were their wives and 
mothers, in that they produced the descendants for the family. However, 
daughters were not significant because they were no longer members of their 
original family after they married. 24  Children who died in infancy were also 
insignificant as regards continuing the family line. The incomplete records of gross 
fertility limit this paper to examining male descendants who survived infancy, and 
I use this sons-only version of net fertility to proxy for net reproduction.  
 
Although every male, whatever his wealth and status, was qualified in the rituals 
of ancestor worship, the records may still have been biased towards high-status 
males, causing an omission of records of low-status males. However, the 
representation of different social ranks in the sample suggests that this bias is 
absent. According to Chang’s estimates (1955, p. 114, Figure 2), before 1850, the 
percentages of gentry-scholars in total population were about 1.3% in Jiangsu 
Province and 1.4% in Zhejiang Province; after 1850, the percentages increased to 
2.5% and 5.0% respectively. As shown in Table A3a, about 95% of the male 
population in the sample were commoners, and less than 2% of the males held 
office during their lifetime. I also compared the proportion of degree holders and 
civil officials in my sample with the proportion in the Tongcheng sample studied 
in Shiue (2017, Table 1). Applying the status classification used in this paper to 
the Tongcheng sample, 90.53% of the 8,892 males were of rank 1, 1.75% of them 
were of rank 2, and 7.72% of them were of ranks 3-7. This distribution of different 
ranks is comparable with the distribution of my lineage sample (see Table A3a). 
 
                                                     
23 Only 9,409 daughters were recorded in the sample, compared with 40,233 sons. 
24 Surprisingly, in the Zha lineage, one of the elite lineages, only twenty-five men had records of 
their daughters.  
23 
 
Another potential bias in the data concerns whether the recorded number of sons 
is complete. Theoretically, in order to record the patrilineal history, the number of 
sons who survived infancy that each male family member produced is the essential 
information for inclusion in the genealogical books, and this would not be affected 
by the male’s social status. However, the quality of the records may still induce 
bias. If high-ranking males had complete records of sons, but commoners were 
selective, this selectiveness would induce spurious findings and drive the status-
fertility relationship to something positive. Nonetheless, as I show in Section 5.2 
below, the results are robust to potential bias.  
 
4.4 A potential reverse causality problem 
If having more sons can increase the father’s social status, there is a risk of reverse 
causality. Although sons were forbidden to inherit keju-related status from fathers, 
one practice in imperial China was for the Emperor to reward the father of a high-
ranking official with an official position or an honorary title to acknowledge the 
official’s outstanding performance.  
 
Different terms and words would be used in the status records of these fathers, 
making their status distinguishable from status earned through regular 
approaches. In the sample, twenty-five males were rewarded with titles of honour 
because of their sons or grandsons. However, since eighteen of them received this 
reward posthumously, their fertility was unaffected by it. I did not count the 
higher ranks conferred after death on these eighteen males as their ranks, but 
classified them into the groups that their own achievements merited. The 
remaining seven males were rewarded with these honorary positions while they 
were still alive, but because the genealogies did not record when they received 
them, I excluded them from the sample to deal with the possible endogeneity 
problem. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Baseline results 
This section presents the baseline results for the relationship between net fertility 
and social status. I first report the results of Equation (1) under the OLS 
regression, the Poisson regression, and the negative binomial regression (see 
Table 3).25 Figure 5 plots the unconditional rank effects by showing the predicted 
number of sons by social rank calculated by the negative binomial regression.  
 
Fig. 5 Unconditional Status-fertility Relationship. 
 
 
Notes: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, the expected number of sons at each level 
of rank calculated by the negative binomial regression in column (5) of Table 3. 2. Error bars 
indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals.  
 
The results of the three models are closely comparable. All the “rank” coefficients 
in the three models are statistically and quantitatively significant, and the rank 
effects are mainly linear, as also displayed in Figure 5, with only a relatively lower 
rank 5 coefficient.  
 
In general, higher social ranks did translate into more recorded sons. The OLS 
coefficients in column 1 suggest that the predicted number of sons of a rank 1 male 
                                                     
25 See also Table A7 for the average number of sons by status in the six lineages. 
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was 1.073 sons, and males in ranks 2 to 6 and rank 7 were predicted to have about 
one more son and two more sons respectively than the males in rank 1.  
 
The coefficients of the Poisson regression in column 3 are the same as the ones of 
the negative binomial regression in column 5. As shown in the two columns and 
also in Figure 5, rank 1 males could be expected to have one son, and males of 
ranks 2-6 could be expected to have about two sons. Rank 7 had the largest positive 
effect, and a rank 7 male was expected to have about 3.2 times as many sons as a 
rank 1 male had. 
 
Conditioning on the birth cohorts of the males does not change the positive status-
fertility relationship much (see columns 2, 4, and 6). As shown in columns 4 and 
6, including the birth cohort fixed effects reduces the coefficients on social ranks 
to a small degree. A rank 7 male still had more than twice as many sons as a rank 
1 male had. 
 
The reason for lower rank 5 coefficients in all models lies in the fact that all the 
rank 5 males were in a difficult situation. Of the 224 males in rank 5, 119 of them 
were prospective officials, who were waiting for vacancies in the positions they 
were hired; 91 of them were the lowest-ranking employees in the bureaucratic 
system; the last 14 of them were median degree holders who failed to get an official 
position. Although the social status of rank 5 males was higher than that of males 
in ranks 3 and 4, they were tied to the bureaucratic system and did not have any 
additional monetary benefits for their status. In contrast, for the ranks 3 and 4 
males, after they received a low-level degree, a lot of them chose not to waste more 
time on the highly competitive keju exams and changed their careers to leave 
government service.  
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Table 3 Unconditional Relationship between Social Status and Recorded Number 
of Sons, OLS Regression, Poisson Regression, and Negative Binomial Regression 
 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS Poisson Negative 
Binomial 
Rank 2 0.966*** 
(0.091) 
0.757*** 
(0.092) 
1.901*** 
[0.642] 
(0.045) 
1.600*** 
[0.470] 
(0.046) 
1.901*** 
[0.642] 
(0.045) 
1.625*** 
[0.485] 
(0.048) 
Rank 3 1.038*** 
(0.079) 
0.796*** 
(0.082) 
1.968*** 
[0.677] 
(0.038) 
1.611*** 
[0.477] 
(0.041) 
1.968*** 
[0.677] 
(0.038) 
1.672*** 
[0.514] 
(0.043) 
Rank 4 1.126*** 
(0.067) 
0.990*** 
(0.068) 
2.050*** 
[0.718] 
(0.031) 
1.833*** 
[0.606] 
(0.033) 
2.050*** 
[0.718] 
(0.031) 
1.901*** 
[0.642] 
(0.035) 
Rank 5 0.763*** 
(0.090) 
0.682*** 
(0.090) 
1.712*** 
[0.537] 
(0.049) 
1.594*** 
[0.466] 
(0.050) 
1.712*** 
[0.537] 
(0.049) 
1.636*** 
[0.492] 
(0.052) 
Rank 6 1.225*** 
(0.093) 
1.090*** 
(0.092) 
2.141*** 
[0.761] 
(0.041) 
1.902*** 
[0.643] 
(0.041) 
2.141*** 
[0.761] 
(0.041) 
1.939*** 
[0.662] 
(0.042) 
Rank 7 2.302*** 
(0.274) 
1.941*** 
(0.279) 
3.146*** 
[1.146] 
(0.081) 
2.377*** 
[0.866] 
(0.085) 
3.146*** 
[1.146] 
(0.081) 
2.431*** 
[0.888] 
(0.096) 
Controls       
Birth Cohort 
FE 
N Y N Y N Y 
Constant 1.073*** 
(0.007) 
1.599*** 
(0.102) 
1.073*** 
[0.070] 
(0.007) 
1.551*** 
[0.439] 
(0.058) 
1.073*** 
[0.070] 
(0.007) 
1.578*** 
[0.456] 
(0.060) 
N 35,691 34,140 35,691 34,140 35,691 34,140 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.036 0.101 0.015 0.051 0.008 0.033 
 
Note: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses in column 
(1). 3. Coefficients in column (2) are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial model. 
Negative binomial regression coefficients are shown in square brackets, and robust standard 
errors of the negative binomial regression coefficients are in parentheses in column 2. 4. *p<0.1; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
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5.2 Status-fertility relationships conditioned on socioeconomic factors 
To further examine the status-fertility relationship, I include the set of 
socioeconomic covariates that could also affect net reproduction into the analysis. 
Table 4 details the status-fertility relationships conditioned on the set of control 
variables. As columns 1, 4, and 5 show, if conditioned on birth cohort and lineage 
fixed effects, whether a male was first-born, and whether he out-migrated, the 
relationships are all similar to the unconditional relationship shown in Table 3.  
 
However, controlling for the male’s human capital and marriages noticeably 
reduces the rank effects, suggesting that both of these variables are mechanisms 
through which social rank affected fertility. When controlling for zi and hao 
ownership in columns 3 and 7, all rank gradients decline, but they remain 
statistically significant, and the scale of the decline is modest. A rank 7 male could 
still have been expected to have about twice as many sons as a rank 1 male had.  
 
Moreover, conditioning on the number of marriages leads to a substantial decrease 
in all the rank coefficients, especially the coefficients on ranks 6 and 7 (columns 2 
and 6). The results in columns 1 and 2 show that, without controlling for the 
number of marriages and for survival to adulthood, climbing the social ladder from 
rank 1 to rank 7 would increase the expected number of sons by a factor of 2.844 
(column 1), whereas after controlling for these two variables, moving from rank 1 
to rank 7 would increase the expected number of sons by a factor of only 1.246 
(column 2). Additionally, the large coefficient of survival to adulthood shows the 
important role that lifespan played in affecting fertility. 
 
Comparing the results in column 7 and column 8 more clearly illustrates the point 
that the number of marriages is the key mechanism through which social status 
could increase the number of sons. The two figures in Figure 6 provide a stark 
contrast between the two sets of rank effects in the two models, first without 
controlling and then controlling for marriages. Before including the number of 
marriages in the regression (column 7), all the rank coefficients are significant and 
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large, indicating that ranks higher than 1 were expected to increase one’s number 
of sons by about 40 per cent to 96 per cent.  
 
After including the number of marriages to the regression, the results in column 
8 indicate that only ranks 2 and 4 still hold statistical significance and positive 
effects on the number of sons, yet these ranks would have increased the expected 
number of sons by only about 15 per cent and 14 per cent respectively. The 
statistically significant coefficients indicate that a near-gentry male or a lower 
degree holder would produce more surviving sons per marriage than a non-gentry 
male would. Nevertheless, the overly wide confidence intervals of the coefficients 
on ranks 5, 6, and 7 barred us from identifying any appreciable effects of rank. 
Thus, the dramatic decline of rank effects in these three ranks shows that males 
in ranks 5 to 7 had more surviving sons than non-gentry males, but they did so 
primarily by having more marriages. 26 
 
Moreover, as previously discussed in Section 4.3, if the findings are spurious and 
driven by the fact that the number of commoners’ sons was under-recorded, the 
positive feedback between social status and number of sons would not change after 
controlling for marriages, as the number of sons per wife of commoners should still 
be fewer than the equivalent of high-status males. The similar net fertility at each 
level of rank shown in the left plot of Figure 6 confirms that the findings are robust 
to this potential bias.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26 Per Arthi and Fenske (2018), polygamy in Nigeria increased child mortality in the contemporary 
period, but not in the historical context. I also used my sample to test the relationship between the 
number of marriages of the father and the son’s chance of dying before adulthood, and the positive 
relationship is absent. My results suggest that if the father had two or three marriages, the chance 
of dying before adulthood for his son was not different from that of a son whose father had only 
one marriage. If the father had more than three marriages, then his son would have a statistically 
and quantitatively significant higher probability of surviving to adulthood.  
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Fig. 6 Conditioned Effects of Rank Before and After Conditioning on the Number 
of Marriages, Estimation Equation 1. 
 
Note: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, predicted number of sons at each level of 
rank, of the models shown in column (7) and column (8) of Table 4. 2. Error bars indicate 95 per 
cent confidence intervals.  
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Table 4 Estimating the Recorded Number of Sons, Negative Binomial Regression 
 Dependent Variable:  
Number of sons 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rank 2 1.823*** 
(0.090) 
1.281*** 
(0.074) 
1.447*** 
(0.073) 
1.825*** 
(0.090) 
1.823*** 
(0.090) 
1.283*** 
(0.074) 
1.442*** 
(0.070) 
1.147** 
(0.066) 
Rank 3 1.812*** 
(0.072) 
1.218*** 
(0.055) 
1.391*** 
(0.056) 
1.808*** 
(0.072) 
1.805*** 
(0.072) 
1.214*** 
(0.055) 
1.379*** 
(0.054) 
1.069 
(0.048) 
Rank 4 2.009*** 
(0.066) 
1.290*** 
(0.048) 
1.551*** 
(0.053) 
2.012*** 
(0.066) 
2.005*** 
(0.066) 
1.290*** 
(0.048) 
1.509*** 
(0.050) 
1.140*** 
(0.044) 
Rank 5 1.909*** 
(0.102) 
1.175*** 
(0.066) 
1.471*** 
(0.080) 
1.906*** 
(0.102) 
1.906*** 
(0.101) 
1.173*** 
(0.066) 
1.395*** 
(0.073) 
1.037 
(0.059) 
Rank 6 2.268*** 
(0.095) 
1.163** 
(0.068) 
1.690*** 
(0.075) 
2.274*** 
(0.096) 
2.260*** 
(0.095) 
1.164*** 
(0.068) 
1.630*** 
(0.071) 
1.013 
(0.060) 
Rank 7 2.844*** 
(0.280) 
1.246* 
(0.152) 
2.015*** 
(0.220) 
2.834*** 
(0.277) 
2.836*** 
(0.279) 
1.242* 
(0.151) 
1.961*** 
(0.201) 
1.047 
(0.130) 
Marriages  2.252*** 
(0.033) 
   2.244*** 
(0.033) 
 2.174*** 
(0.032) 
Zi   1.502*** 
(0.022) 
   1.390*** 
(0.020) 
1.235*** 
(0.018) 
Hao   1.361*** 
(0.032) 
   1.351*** 
(0.031) 
1.191*** 
(0.029) 
Firstborn    1.045*** 
(0.013) 
 1.027** 
(0.012) 
1.048*** 
(0.013) 
1.033** 
(0.012) 
Out-migration     0.351*** 
(0.063) 
0.480*** 
(0.079) 
0.374*** 
(0.065) 
0.492*** 
(0.080) 
Survival  43.103*** 
(7.063) 
   43.203*** 
(7.205) 
80.425*** 
(13.528) 
42.684*** 
(7.113) 
 
 
        
31 
 
Controls 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.413*** 
(0.107) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
1.135* 
(0.084) 
1.382*** 
(0.105) 
1.413*** 
(0.107) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
N 34,140 34,140 34,140 34,140 34,140 34,140 34,140 34,140 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.146 0.051 0.042 0.042 0.147 0.093 0.150 
 
Note: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. The coefficients in the table are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial model. 3. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 4. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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5.3 Social gradients in fertility by sub-period 
I then examine the social gradients in net fertility over time. Although the 
consistent keju system and similar state bureaucratic structures make the social 
stratification mostly static and stable in the Ming and Qing dynasties, it cannot 
be taken for granted that the social status effect of each rank on fertility is 
constant over time. Hence, I estimate Equation 1 by four sub-periods, with results 
listed in Tables 5a and 5b. Because only four rank 7 males were born during the 
nineteenth century, I combined rank 6 and rank 7 in the period 1800-1900. 
 
Both of the two tables show the strong positive effects of human capital on net 
reproduction over the five centuries. However, the larger coefficients on zi and hao 
in columns 3 and 4 than in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the ownership of zi and 
hao had a stronger effect before 1700 than after 1700.   
 
As Table 5a shows, before conditioning on the number of marriages, a rise in social 
ranks would have significantly increased the number of sons a male could expect 
to produce throughout the period. However, the positive rank effects on fertility 
were much stronger after 1600 than before it, and they were the strongest in the 
latter half of the Qing dynasty (1800-1900).  
 
After I included the number of marriages, most of the positive effects disappeared, 
whereas the coefficients on ranks 3 to 6 (and 7) remained statistically significant 
in the nineteenth century (see Table 5b). The results show that in the period 1400-
1800, males of ranks higher than 1 still produced more sons primarily by having 
more marriages. For males born in 1800-1900, high social rank still brought them 
more marriages and thus higher net reproduction, but except for this, the “pure” 
effects of rank also played a significant part in determining fertility.  
 
The rank coefficients in 1800-1900 are higher than those in 1400-1800, due to the 
low net fertility of rank 1 males in the nineteenth century. Owing to the Taiping 
Rebellion (1851-1864), a massive civil war in the late Qing period, the Lower 
Yangzi Region experienced a dramatic population loss in the late 1850s and early 
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1860s.27 In the six lineages, the Gu and Zhuang lineages suffered the most in these 
conflicts. Of all the Gu and Zhuang males with death year records, 845 died in 
1860-1863, 810 of them being commoners. Figure 7 shows the marked increase of 
deaths in 1860-70 in the two lineages. The conflict shortened the average length 
of men’s lives and thus decreased the average number of sons they produced. The 
large coefficient on the number of marriages in the period 1800-1900 can also be 
explained by this population lost.  
 
The status-fertility relationship in the five centuries presented in this section is 
somewhat different from the story told by Shiue (2017). She finds a Beckerian 
child quantity-quality trade-off in the early Qing dynasty (1644-1800) because of 
the high return in human capital during this period. Toward the end of the Qing 
dynasty (after 1800), the decline in the return to education led to the 
disappearance of the negative child quantity-quality relationship. The results in 
the present paper indicate that the high-status males at least did not sacrifice the 
quantity of sons.28 The positive relationship for the six lineages which persisted 
throughout the entire Qing dynasty also suggests that future studies should look 
more deeply into the quantity-quality trade-off in pre-modern China in future 
studies.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27 Estimates suggest that the total population lost in China could have been more than 70 million 
(Li and Lin 2015). 
28 See Appendix B.2 for a robustness check by controlling for the father effects in the model, namely 
the number of brothers and ranks of fathers.  
29 Recent scholars suggest that we should use the occurrence of twin births, an unexpected and 
exogenous shock to the family size, to examine these trade-off effects (Clark and Cummins 2018; 
Clark, Cummins and Curtis 2019). After using the incidence of twin births, the previously observed 
negative relationship between child quantity and quality in many pre-modern Western European 
societies disappears. 
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.Fig 7 Frequency of Death Year in the Gu and Zhuang Lineages, 1600-1900. 
 
 
Note: The figure plots only males whose death year is recorded.  
Source: The lineage sample. 
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Table 5a Rank Effects on the Recorded Number of Sons by Sub-period, Negative 
Binomial Regression, without Conditioning on Marriages (1) 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Birth period 1400-
1600 
1600-
1700 
1700-
1800 
1800-
1900 
Rank 2 1.383** 
(0.192) 
1.238** 
(0.128) 
1.337*** 
(0.088) 
2.048*** 
(0.294) 
Rank 3 1.065 
(0.092) 
1.145** 
(0.078) 
1.353*** 
(0.086) 
1.770*** 
(0.164) 
Rank 4 1.015 
(0.116) 
1.247*** 
(0.085) 
1.465*** 
(0.067) 
1.920*** 
(0.150) 
Rank 5 0.931 
(0.139) 
1.254* 
(0.150) 
1.303*** 
(0.092) 
2.235*** 
(0.254) 
Rank 6 1.239* 
(0.139) 
1.494*** 
(0.150) 
1.509*** 
(0.094) 
2.649*** 
(0.328) 
Rank 7 1.466*** 
(0.217) 
1.708*** 
(0.220) 
1.820*** 
(0.314) 
. 
Zi 1.447** 
(0.072) 
1.456*** 
(0.047) 
1.348*** 
(0.029) 
1.273*** 
(0.038) 
Hao 1.298*** 
(0.070) 
1.265*** 
(0.061) 
1.377*** 
(0.049) 
1.380*** 
(0.072) 
Controls     
Firstborn Y Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.424** 
(0.122) 
1.096 
(0.072) 
0.992 
(0.053) 
0.243*** 
(0.044) 
N 1,877 4,658 11,957 11,527 
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.026 0.019 0.038 
 
Notes: 1. Males who failed to survive to adulthood (observations with survival = 0) were removed 
in this regression. 2. In the period 1800-1900, ranks 6 and 7 are combined together in column (4). 
3. Coefficients are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial model. 4. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 5.*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 5b Rank Effects on the Recorded Number of Sons by Sub-period, Negative 
Binomial Regression, Conditioning on Marriages (2) 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Birth period 1400-1600 1600-1700 1700-1800 1800-1900 
Rank 2 1.303* 
(0.185) 
1.089 
(0.124) 
1.143* 
(0.087) 
1.257 
(0.242) 
Rank 3 0.951 
(0.085) 
1.006 
(0.064) 
1.136 
(0.091) 
1.177 
(0.139) 
Rank 4 0.924 
(0.103) 
1.111 
(0.078) 
1.077 
(0.056) 
1.395*** 
(0.122) 
Rank 5 0.835 
(0.126) 
1.006 
(0.129) 
1.038 
(0.081) 
1.264** 
(0.135) 
Rank 6 0.951 
(0.157) 
1.247* 
(0.147) 
0.829** 
(0.069) 
1.359** 
(0.167) 
Rank 7 0.851 
(0.186) 
1.338* 
(0.236) 
0.776 
(0.193) 
. 
Marriages 1.555*** 
(0.059) 
1.521*** 
(0.052) 
2.087*** 
(0.044) 
2.986*** 
(0.086) 
Zi 1.315*** 
(0.065) 
1.354*** 
(0.043) 
1.186*** 
(0.025) 
1.133*** 
(0.035) 
Hao 1.207*** 
(0.067) 
1.174*** 
(0.059) 
1.179*** 
(0.045) 
1.233*** 
(0.068) 
Controls     
Firstborn Y Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.951 
(0.080) 
0.798*** 
(0.055) 
0.579*** 
(0.030) 
0.144*** 
(0.024) 
N 1,877 4,658 11,957 11,527 
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.057 0.078 0.114 
 
Notes: 1. Males who failed to survive to adulthood (observations with survival = 0) were removed 
in this regression. 2. In the period 1800-1900, ranks 6 and 7 were combined together in column 
(4). 3. Coefficients are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial model. 4. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 5.*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
5.4 The excessive zero counts  
As discussed in Section 4.2, because of the excess zeroes in the dependent variable, 
I applied the zero-inflated negative binomial regression to see if the status-fertility 
relationship still held. Since having a wife is the prerequisite for having a son, the 
number of marriages is used to predict the “always zero” in the model.  
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Table 6 details the results. As expected, the number of marriages is a significant 
predictor of the membership in the “always zero” group. If a male were to have one 
more wife, the odds that he would be in the “always zero” group would decrease by 
a factor of 31.34 in column 1 and a factor of 36.43 in column 2.  
 
For males not in the “always zero” group, in other words, for all the married men, 
the number of marriages retains its significance and strong effect, but social status 
contributes more to increase net fertility. As column 2 shows, all the rank 
coefficients have strong positive effects on the number of sons. Males of a social 
rank higher than 1 were more likely to have more sons than rank 1 males did 
(about 20 per cent more for ranks 2 and 4, 15 per cent more for rank 3, 12 per cent 
more for rank 5, 30 per cent more for rank 6, and 60 per cent more for rank 7). 
Compared to the results in column 8 of Table 4 that only coefficients on ranks 2 
and 4 are statistically significant, the different results here suggest that, with 
higher socio-economic status, the married Confucians could leave more surviving 
sons per marriage than the married commoners, a pattern also suggested by Clark 
and Hamilton (2006) for the pre-modern English society.  
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Table 6 Rank Effects on the Number of Sons, Zero-inflated Negative Binomial 
Regression 
 
 Dependent Variable:  
Number of sons 
 (1) (2) 
Rank 2 1.399*** 
(0.058) 
1.232*** 
(0.053) 
Rank 3 1.373*** 
(0.051) 
1.147*** 
(0.041) 
Rank 4 1.430*** 
(0.043) 
1.199*** 
(0.037) 
Rank 5 1.208*** 
(0.058) 
1.121** 
(0.053) 
Rank 6 1.483*** 
(0.060) 
1.290*** 
(0.052) 
Rank 7 2.166*** 
(0.176) 
1.574*** 
(0.128) 
Marriages  1.134*** 
(0.012) 
Zi  1.113*** 
(0.014) 
Hao  1.203*** 
(0.024) 
Controls   
Firstborn N Y 
Out N Y 
Survival N Y 
Birth cohort FE N Y 
Lineage FE N Y 
Constant 1.558*** 
(0.009) 
0.207*** 
(0.035) 
Inflate   
Marriages -31.336*** 
(0.721) 
-36.431*** 
(0.711) 
Constant 8.312*** 
(0.707) 
7.929*** 
(0.708) 
N 35,691 34,140 
 
Note: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. The coefficients are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the 
negative binomial model. 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 4. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
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5.5 The key mechanism through which social status impacted on fertility is the 
number of marriages 
The results from the previous three sections identify the number of marriages as 
a key mechanism through which social ranks impacted on net fertility. This 
section substantiates this status-marriage relationship.  
 
As mentioned before, only 8.46 per cent of males in the sample married more than 
once. According to the genealogical records, of the commoners who had more than 
one wife, most of them did so only when their first wife died early or failed to 
produce male heirs. Many more chose not to marry again and died without heirs.30 
In contrast, higher-social-class males were under less of a constraint, on average, 
to have more concubines, even if their first wives had already given birth to sons. 
As shown in Table 7 and Table 8, the proportion of remarrying and the proportion 
of having concubines are much higher in the high-social-class sample. In order to 
illustrate this positive relationship between social status and the number of 
marriages, I ran both OLS and Poisson regressions of this form:  
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖𝛽 + H𝑖 ,           (2) 
 
in which Marriage indicates the total number of marriages, and the other 
notations are as in Estimation equation (1).  
 
The estimation results are shown in Table 9. Given that only two men were in 
rank 7 in the three common lineages, I combined rank 6 and rank 7 together in 
the model in column 5. The coefficients on ranks in all of the six columns 
demonstrate a linear correlation between social rank and the total number of 
marriages, with only rank 5 seeming to break the trend again. The results confirm 
that the number of marriages is positively correlated to social status. A male with 
a higher social status was more likely to have more marriages over his lifetime. 
                                                     
30 This can also largely account for the universality of adoption in pre-modern China mentioned in 
Lee and Wang (1999, Chapter 7). Many males with no heir could not afford to marry again, so most 
of them would have chosen to adopt a brother’s son to continue their own family lines.  
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For instance, the results in column 4 suggest that rank 2 males could have an 
average 32 per cent more marriages than rank 1 males had, and rank 7 males 
could be expected to have about twice as many marriages as rank 1 males had.  
 
The results in columns 5 and 6 demonstrate the different effects of social ranks on 
the number of marriages in the two types of lineage. In the common lineages, high 
social ranks did not necessarily translate into a large number of marriages. Being 
in the top two ranks in the common lineages had a minimal effect on the number 
of marriages; males in ranks 2-5 married more times than the males in ranks 6-7. 
As Figure 8 also shows, in the common lineages, the rank 6 and 7 males could be 
predicted to have only 0.1 more marriages than the common males. Of the twenty-
six ranks 6-7 males in the common lineages, only six of them had two marriages, 
and the other twenty of them had only one marriage over their lifetime. Although 
the small sample size of the top-ranking males in the common lineages is not 
representative enough to make a strong conclusion, the result suggests that for 
the bureaucrats in the common lineages, having more marriages is not the 
primary strategy they adopted to achieve reproductive success. 
 
In contrast, the status-marriage relationship in the elite lineages is linear and 
much stronger. A rank 6 male, on average, could have an additional 0.6 marriages 
than a rank 1 male, and a rank 7 male could have an additional 0.7 more 
marriages. The comparison between the two types of lineage indicates that the 
number of marriages a male could have was affected by the lineage he came from. 
In general, rank 2 males in common lineages could marry more than their 
counterparts in the elite lineages; for males in ranks other than 2, belonging to an 
elite lineage brought more marriages than belonging to a common lineage did. 
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Table 7 Distribution of Number of Marriages by Rank  
 
Number of total 
marriages 
Rank 1 Ranks 2-7 
N % N % 
0 10,530 31.16 36 1.90 
1 20,868 61.75 1,237 65.17 
2 2,109 6.24 466 24.55 
>2 286 0.84 159 8.38 
Total 33,793 100.00 1,898 100.00 
 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
Table 8 Prevalence of Remarriage and Polygamy in the Sample of Married Males 
 
 
Rank 1 Ranks 2-7 
N % N % 
Number of remarriages     
0 21,068 90.56 1,413 75.89 
1 1,978 8.50 368 19.76 
>1 217 0.94 81 4.35 
Total 23,263 100.00 1,862 100.00 
Number of concubines      
0 23,003 98.88 1,620 87.00 
1 241 1.04 197 10.58 
>1 19 0.08 45 2.42 
Total 23,263 100.00 1,862 100.00 
 
Note: “Remarriage” means the marriage after the death of the previous wife. 
Source: The sub-sample of married males. 
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Fig. 8 Predicted Number of Marriages, Estimation Equation 2, by Lineage Type. 
 
 
Note: 1. Values are the average adjusted predictions, the predicted number of marriages at each 
level of rank of the models shown in column 5 (common lineages) and column 6 (elite lineages) of 
Table 9. 2. Error bars indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
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Table 9 OLS and Poisson Regressions on the Number of Marriages 
 
  Dependent Variable: Number of Marriages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS Poisson Poisson 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
Common 
Lineages 
Elite 
Lineages 
Rank 2 0.512*** 
(0.044) 
0.313*** 
(0.044) 
1.667*** 
(0.057) 
1.319*** 
(0.046) 
1.522*** 
(0.103) 
1.215*** 
(0.048) 
Rank 3 0.588*** 
(0.035) 
0.354*** 
(0.035) 
1.764*** 
(0.046) 
1.368*** 
(0.037) 
1.399*** 
(0.086) 
1.360*** 
(0.041) 
Rank 4 0.602*** 
(0.027) 
0.409*** 
(0.028) 
1.783*** 
(0.036) 
1.437*** 
(0.031) 
1.281*** 
(0.056) 
1.466*** 
(0.037) 
Rank 5 0.596*** 
(0.043) 
0.396*** 
(0.043) 
1.775*** 
(0.056) 
1.424*** 
(0.048) 
1.366** 
(0.172) 
1.452*** 
(0.050) 
Rank 6 0.862*** 
(0.050) 
0.632*** 
(0.050) 
2.121*** 
(0.065) 
1.649*** 
(0.053) 
1.168* 
(0.094) 
1.703*** 
(0.057) 
Rank 7 1.169*** 
(0.163) 
0.829*** 
(0.165) 
2.520*** 
(0.213) 
1.765*** 
(0.154) 
. 1.867*** 
(0.164) 
Controls       
Zi N Y N Y Y Y 
Hao N Y N Y Y Y 
Firstborn N Y N Y Y Y 
Out-
migration 
N Y N Y Y Y 
Survival N Y N Y Y Y 
Birth cohort 
FE 
N Y N Y Y Y 
Lineage FE N Y N Y Y Y 
Constant 0.769*** 
(0.002) 
-0.023 
(0.025) 
0.769*** 
(0.003) 
0.055*** 
(0.005) 
0.106*** 
(0.018) 
0.061*** 
(0.008) 
N 35,691 34,140 35,691 34,140 9,580 24,560 
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.251 0.011 0.077 0.049 0.089 
 
Note: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. Coefficients in the table are incidence rate ratios (IRR) 
for the Poisson model. 3. As only two males were of rank 7 in the common lineages, rank 6 and 7 
are combined in column 5. 4. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 5. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01.  
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Clark and Hamilton (2006) argued that one of the mechanisms through which 
wealth affected fertility in pre-modern England was that the rich produced more 
births per year of marriage than the poor, and the children of the rich were more 
likely to survive. Unfortunately, because of the nature of the probate records, the 
role played by marriage is not clear in the English case. However, the number of 
marriages does most to explain the reproductive success of the Confucian elites in 
Ming-Qing China: high-ranking males, especially those from elite lineages, were 
wealthier and thus able to marry more women to increase their number of male 
descendants.  
 
Chen, He, Lin and Peng (2018, p. 263) examined 3,119 cases between 1736 and 
1896 recorded in xinke tiben (the Qing Criminal Archive, 刑科题本) and found that 
the average bride price was 19.3 silver taels. Although individual wealth was 
unrecorded in the genealogical books, we can still compare this bride price with 
wage estimates using other sources in the existing literature to see this 
mechanism. 
 
Zhao (1983, pp. 55-56) estimates that a farm worker in the Yangzi Delta could 
earn around two to five silver taels in cash per year, and Pomeranz (2000, pp. 95) 
supports this estimate. Similarly, according to Chen et al. (2018, p. 265), the 
annual wage for a farm worker in the Qing dynasty was about three to five silver 
taels.31 According to these estimates, the average farm worker in the Qing dynasty 
needed at least four years to save enough money to pay for a wife.  
 
If he were a Qing bureaucrat, he could earn much more than five taels a year. For 
the lowest-ranking civil official, the annual income was about thirty-three silver 
taels, nearly ten times greater than that of a peasant worker (Chang 1962; see 
                                                     
31 The two wage estimates that I cite here are estimates that exclude food allowances. The daily 
wage, including a food allowance, was reckoned at 0.045 taels, which was about 16 taels a year in 
the Yangzi Delta (Allen, Bassino, Ma, Moll‐Murata, and Van Zanden 2011, pp.15-16). However, 
food allowances were consumed by workers daily, and besides, in the Chinese cultural tradition, a 
bride price cannot be exclusively composed of baskets of grains or rice, so it would be misleading 
to consider wages as inclusive of the food allowance here. 
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Table 10). Middle- and high-ranking local officials could also receive a substantial 
amount of “yang-lien allowance” (integrity allowance, 养廉银) every year.32 In my 
rank classification, the fourth- to ninth-ranking local officials and the eighth- and 
ninth-ranking capital officials are included in the rank 6 group, and the first- to 
third-ranking local officials and the first- to seventh-ranking capital officials are 
all included in the rank 7 group. The high annual income guaranteed that even a 
low-ranking officeholder could afford more marriages.  
 
Table 10 Annual Regulated Salary of Qing Officials, by Official Rank 
 
Official rank 
Capital 
officials 
Local officials 
1 307.8 180 
2 256.5 150 
3 222.3 130 
4 179.5 105 
5 136.8 80 
6 102.6 60 
7 76.9 45 
8 68.4 40 
9 54.4 33.114 
 
Notes: 1. Official rank 1 is the highest rank and official rank 9 is the lowest.  2. Official ranks 1 
to 7 capital officials and official ranks 1 to 3 local officials belong to the Rank 7 in the sample. 
Official ranks 8 to 9 capital officials and official ranks 4 to 9 local officials belong to the Rank 6 in 
the sample.  
Source: Chang (1962, pp.35-36, Table 10 and Table 11).  
 
However, if two males were of the same rank, why the one from the elite lineages 
could marry more times than his common-lineage counterpart in general? This 
can be explained through examining the lineage fund practice. As previously 
mentioned, lineage was the most widespread form of social organization in Ming 
and Qing China. It was, for one thing, a combination of families who shared the 
same ancestor and the same surname, but it was also a combination of families 
who owned various types of property together. In addition to compiling 
                                                     
32 The integrity allowance was several times greater than the regulated salary. For example, a 
governor of Jiangsu Province (a second-ranking local official) could receive an integrity allowance 
as high as 12,000 silver taels, and a seventh-ranking local official in Zhejiang Province could 
receive an allowance somewhere between 500 and 1,800 taels (Chang 1962, pp.12-13). 
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genealogical books, another common practice in the lineages was “sequestering a 
portion of the patrimony of each generation” as “lineage trusts” (Zelin 2009, p.626). 
Most of the endowments were landed estates. While most common lineages were 
not rich enough to own land, most elite lineages not only owned land but also used 
their profits from the landed estates in many other lineage activities, such as 
investing in the education of young boys in preparation for keju (Zelin 2009). Thus, 
males from elite lineages were able to make use of lineage wealth and also the 
high reputation attached to their family name to marry, something their common-
lineage counterparts could never afford.  
 
The pattern for rank 2 males is different: rank 2 males in common lineages 
married more times than rank 2 males in elite lineages. This is due to the different 
composition of rank 2 males in the two types of lineages. In general, rank 2 males 
are the ones who had non-keju related social status records in their entry. In the 
common lineages, most of them had donated to their lineages, where they were 
probably rich individuals who got their wealth from occupations other than being 
gentry-scholars. On the contrary, in the elite lineages, most of them were teachers 
in village schools or editors of genealogical books who failed the keju exams and 
were not able to engage in high-income occupations other than joining the 
bureaucracy. 
 
 
6 Robustness 
This section presents the robustness of the previous results to (1) additionally 
controlling for lifespan, (2) conditioning on father impacts and family background, 
(3) an alternative classification of social status, and (4) categorizing Marriages as 
an ordinal variable. Table B1 in Appendix B presents the summary statistics for 
the new variables used in this session. 
 
6.1 Additional control: lifespan 
A male’s lifespan could also be a confounding factor that affected his fertility 
behaviour. Using a sub-sample of 11,210 males with full life records, I controlled 
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for male’s age at death, treating it as a continuous variable and also a categorical 
factor, and found an unaffected status-fertility relationship (Table B2 in Appendix 
B).  
 
6.2 Conditioning on father impacts and family background 
To account for any potential influence from his original family, I included in the 
regression the number of brothers that a male had and his father’s social rank. As 
Table B3a shows, conditioning on the number of brothers and father’s social rank 
does not affect the main results.  
 
To further examine that if family background could be influencing the baseline 
results (i.e., if male net fertility is driven by the household wealth and father’s 
social rank as opposed to their own), I also test the impacts of different ranks on 
individual net fertility within the same household. I use differences in net fertility 
between brothers to see if rank still has an effect on the number of sons despite 
family background. I run the following model to test the relationship between the 
difference in attained social ranks and the difference in net fertility between 
brothers:  
 𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑝 + 𝛽1Father Rank𝑝 + 𝛽2Birth Cohort𝑝 + 𝛽3Lineage𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝,           (3) 
 
where Dif_Sons is the variable indicating the difference in the number of sons two 
brothers had, and Dif_Rank equals the difference in the social ranks of the two 
brothers. p denotes the observation unit, the pair of brothers. I also control for the 
father’s social rank, the birth cohort of the brothers, and the lineage they came 
from. Table B3b reports the results, and standard errors are clustered by 
household (defined by father). 
 
By changing the observation units to pairs of brothers, the regression controls for 
the effects of family background on net fertility of the sons in the same household. 
The results in the three columns all indicate that the difference in the net fertility 
of two brothers came from the difference in their attained social ranks.  
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6.3 An alternative classification of social status 
The significant effects of ranks 2 and 4 shown in the baseline results in Table 4 
could be spurious because of a broad classification of social status. Therefore, I 
construct a more detailed classification containing twelve levels of status (see 
Table B4) to check for the robustness of the one presented in Table 2.  
 
Table B5 reports the results of Equation (2) under a negative binomial regression 
using the new social status variable. The main results are robust to the new 
classification. Besides the unaffected relationship between status and fertility, 
Table B5 also shows that having more marriages was the key strategy which 
gentry scholars adopted to ensure reproductive success. As column 3 shows, before 
controlling for the number of marriages, all the statuses higher than status 1 have 
positive effects on net reproduction; after controlling for the number of marriages, 
only the coefficients on statuses 2-4 and 6 maintain to significance (column 4). The 
results are the same as the baseline results in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4.  
 
6.4 Classifying Marriages as an ordinal variable 
As the marginal effects of having one more wife for a single male and a married 
male could be different, I also changed Marriages into an ordinal variable 
containing four wife groups (see Table B6). By using both the OLS and negative 
binomial models, the coefficients on the four wife groups shown in all the columns 
of Table B7 suggest that the number of marriages has a linear effect on the number 
of sons, and the coefficients on ranks for married males are similar to the results 
shown in column 2 of Table 6.  
 
 
7 Discussion of the results 
7.1 Celibacy and Marriage Market in China  
The results in this paper demonstrate an unequal Chinese society. 29.6 per cent 
of the males in the sample failed to marry even once, and 8.46 per cent of them 
married more than once. The man with the most marriages was from the Zhuang 
Lineage, and he married ten times in total (two wives and eight concubines). 
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Opposite to the English elites in the eighteenth century, who had high rates of 
celibacy and childlessness, the gentry class in imperial China was very likely to 
get married (de la Croix et al. 2019). As Table 7 shows, 31.16 per cent of the 
commoners never married, and for males of ranks 2 to 7, the proportion is only 1.9 
per cent.  
 
The result of about thirty per cent of the males in the sample never marrying is 
no surprise. Of the 32,505 males who survived to adulthood (nineteen years old), 
7,572 (23.29 per cent) of them never married. According to the estimate of Lee and 
Campbell (1997, p. 85, Table 5.1), of 3,547 males born in 1774-1873 in rural 
Liaoning who survived to age 25 and age 35, 33.9 per cent and 20.4 per cent of 
them respectively never married. As Lee and Wang (1999, p. 64) point out, “The 
shortage of women, exacerbated by the practice of polygyny and the 
discouragement of female remarriage, prevented a significant proportion of 
Chinese males in the past…from ever marrying.” 
 
My results suggest that besides having concurrent marriages, which was practised 
by only 502 males in the sample, the more prevalent practice of having multiple 
marriages in sequence also exacerbated the shortage of women in the marriage 
market. This raises the question of how the 10,566 unmarried males found 
solutions for having a male heir?  
 
A possible strategy is polyandry, in other words, renting, or buying other people’s 
wives. Sommer (2015, p.24) found about 1,200 legal cases involved polyandry and 
wife-selling in xinke tiben, and some of them illustrated a practice called “getting 
a husband to support a husband”. This was when a wife from a very poor family 
would be rented out to another male, who was usually also impoverished, to be a 
de facto wife in order to support her de jure husband. Because a heavy stigma was 
attached to polyandry, and any offspring produced by a “rented” wife was 
considered illegitimate, the genealogical books that I explored in this paper do not 
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mention it.33 Although polyandry could not be widespread, as Lee and Wang (1999 
p.88) argue that “bastardy was largely non-existent in China”, the number of cases 
recorded in criminal archives indicates that the practice was not absent. Therefore, 
I assume that some of the destitute unmarried commoners in my lineage sample 
also “rented” wives as a last resort. After all, “polyandry was the least bad option 
realistically available” for a “wife” to save her own family and for a “husband” to 
produce his own offspring (Sommer 2015, p.56).  
 
7.2 Human capital formation in China 
The paper supports one key element of the unified growth theory proposed by 
Galor and Moav (2002) – in the Malthusian and the Post-Malthusian regimes, 
higher income translated into higher population growth rates. In the meantime, 
as this paper argues, these high-income males in pre-modern China were also 
males with high educational attainments. Therefore, another critical question 
may be why, despite the growing representation of these high-quality individuals 
in the population, China still failed to make fast technological progress and thus 
the transition to modern economic growth, as Galor and Weil (2000) propose? 
Although the other end of the spectrum – the transition from a positive feedback 
between wealth and population growth rate to a negative one – is not examined in 
this paper, exploring the unique type of human capital in imperial China can 
already shed some light on this puzzle. 
 
Not every type of “high quality” is conducive to the growth process. The hereditary 
human traits that raised social status and increased income in Ming-Qing China 
were unable to bring about any significant technological changes. Current 
literature has emphasized the crucial importance of the generation and 
transmission of the tacit, practical, and innovative “useful knowledge” to modern 
economic growth (Mokyr 2002, 2016; McCloskey 2010; Epstein 2013). Nonetheless, 
the mode of knowledge that has been taught and tested for centuries in China, 
concerned with Confucian morals and philosophy, cannot be regarded as a 
                                                     
33 See Sommer (2015, Chapters 1 and 2) for more detailed accounts of wife renting cases and 
people’s attitudes to polyandry.  
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scientific and technological type of knowledge in any sense and can hardly 
facilitate modern economic growth (Mokyr 2016; Lin 1995; Yuchtman 2017).34  
 
Opposite to a “decentralized and competitive business” model that Mokyr (2016, 
p.292) used to describe the education industry in Europe, education in imperial 
China promoted intellectual obedience and uniformity, rather than innovation. In 
the Ming and Qing dynasties, scholars were forbidden to have academic 
discussions about the Sages’ teachings, not to mention discussions about what 
should be taught in schools and tested in exams.35  
 
In such a case, as McCloskey (2010, p. 162) argues, “the accumulation of human 
capital can be a bad idea, negative capital.” Emphasizing and expanding of 
education during this period only imposed more severe intellectual constraints 
upon a larger population. The reproductive success of the Confucians amplified 
the diffusion of this growth-impeding education, while in the English case, the 
increased proportion of middle classes in society contributed to the diffusion of the 
“growth-promoting education” (de la Croix et al. 2019). As a result, even if the 
quantity-quality trade-off of children did exist in nineteenth-century China, the 
quality that the Chinese elites inclined towards at the time was insufficient 
enough to set off a process of sustained economic growth. 
 
Nonetheless, when ideology begins to change, the accumulation of human capital 
turns to be a good idea. Keju did lead to high literacy and numeracy rates and a 
culture that highly values education in imperial China (Baten et al. 2010). Many 
studies argue that keju had a persistent and positive effect on Chinese economic 
growth in the present day (Brandt et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2018). The broad base 
                                                     
34 McCloskey (2010, pp. 163) points out, “Education can make people spiritually free…without 
making people rich...[E]ducation without the new bourgeois rhetoric is merely a desirable human 
ornament, not the way to human riches.” Education based on Confucian morals cannot even make 
people “spiritually free”, let alone “rich”. 
35 Per Elman (1994, p. 112), “[t]he emperor (or the bureaucracy that spoke for him), not the 
philosopher, had the final say on how Confucian concepts, arguments, and beliefs were put into 
educational practice via examinations.” 
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of human capital generated by the legacy of keju laid the foundation for the 
phenomenal economic growth in China after the late 1970s.  
 
7.3 Survival of Confucianism 
World history has witnessed many examples of cultural persistence amid changes. 
Since the Emperor Wu of Han selected Confucianism as the dominant political 
ideology in the second century, it has also experienced its ups and downs — its 
dominance has several times been challenged, but it has also managed to maintain 
for centuries. Even today, Confucianism still plays a vital role in Chinese society, 
and its long persistence is worth studying.   
 
A recent study by Giuliano and Nunn (2017) shows that the persistence of culture 
is associated with the stability of the living environment across generations. In a 
stable society, where the traditions are relevant and useful to the current 
generation, the traditional culture is more likely to be inherited and to persist 
than in a variable society. The results of this paper provide another perspective 
from which to examine cultural persistence, at least in the Chinese context. The 
reproductive success of the Confucians ensured the reproduction of the existing 
cultural and political system in imperial China. Descendants of the Confucians 
were brought up by studying Confucian classics, and they would derive much 
benefit from retaining the dominance of Confucianism, especially in the political 
and educational system. With a growing proportion of Confucians in the 
population over centuries, no alternative ideology could easily replace the existing 
one.  
 
 
8 Conclusions 
Using detailed genealogical records of six Chinese lineages, this paper reveals a 
positive relationship between net fertility and social status in China from 1400 to 
1900. Overall, compared with the non-gentry class (rank 1), the near gentry class 
and the gentry class (ranks 2-7) were more likely to have more sons who survived 
infancy through having more marriages, and this Malthusian mechanism kept 
53 
 
functioning until the end of the Qing dynasty. Since higher social status resulted 
in greater human capital and income in imperial China, this paper provides 
empirical support for “survival of the richest”, or more precisely, “survival of the 
Confucians” in the Chinese context. Nevertheless, remarriages and the practice of 
polygamy in imperial Chinese society made the primary strategy adopted by the 
Chinese elites for the sake of reproductive success differed from that of their 
Western European counterparts. The results shed light on the long-term economic 
stagnation in Qing China and the persistence of Confucian culture in modern 
China.  
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Appendix A. Extra Tables and Figures 
 
 
Fig. A1 Sample pages from a Chinese Genealogical Book. 
 
 
Source: Familysearch.org. 
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Table A1 Basic Information of Genealogies by Lineage 
 
Lineage Huang Que Zhou Gu Zha Zhuang Total 
Number of volumes 4 16 4 32 24 16 96 
First compilation 
year 
1487 16643 1598 1286 c.1500 1572 / 
Last compilation 
year 
1846 1928 1947 1876 1909 1875 / 
Compilation times1 6 5 12 12 9 10 / 
Average length 
between 
compilations (years) 
59.8 52.8 29.1 49.2 45.4 30.3 / 
Period covered2 
c.1300- 
1846 
c.1300-
1920 
c.1200-
1946 
c.1100-
1876 
1325- 
1905 
c.1350-
1875 
/ 
Number of 
generations  
17 25 28 224 20 20 / 
Male entries 1,411 8,957 1,059 16,536 5,078 4,581 37,622 
Males with birth 
years  
777 6,998 702 6,454 4,552 4,074 23,557 
Individuals with 
birth and death 
years 
685 4,236 679 5,087 3,260 2,340 16,287 
 
Notes: 1. “Compilation times” refers to the recorded times of large-scale compilations recorded in 
the prefaces to genealogical books, not including small-scale editing.  
2. The start of “Period covered” is the approximate birth year of the male in the first entry, and 
the end is the latest birth/death year found in the genealogical book.  
3. This is the first compilation after the branches started to move to Zhejiang. Records of male 
family members before generation 14 are compiled on the basis of the original records in the 
Jiangxi Que genealogies. After the fourteenth generation, all the males recorded in the Que 
genealogies lived in Zhejiang.  
4. Given the long history of the Gu lineage, only generations 17-38 of the Gu lineage are studied 
in the present paper. 
 
 
Table A2 Summary Statistics 
 
Statistics N Mean Std. Min Max 
Number of sons 35,691 1.132 1.358 0 13 
Social rank 35,691 1.168 0.776 1 7 
Number of marriages 35,691 0.804 0.629 0 10 
Courtesy name (zi) 35,691 0.373 0.484 0 1 
Pen name (hao) 35,691 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Firstborn 35,691 0.511 0.500 0 1 
Out-migration 35,691 0.005 0.068 0 1 
Survival to adulthood 35,691 0.911 0.285 0 1 
Birth cohort 34,140 5.187 0.982 1 7 
Lineage 35,691 3.830 1.351 1 6 
 
Note: 1. Number of zero counts in “Number of sons” is 15,830. 2. Number of zero counts in 
“Number of marriages” is 10,637. 3. Number of Brothers equals the number of father’s sons, 
which includes the individual himself.  
Source: The lineage sample. 
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Table A3a Rank Distribution by Lineage 
 
Rank Huang Que Zhou Gu Zha Zhuang Total  Percent 
1 1,477 7,092 816 15,951 4,861 3,596 33,793 94.68% 
2 5 8 73 73 43 29 231 0.65% 
3 2 66 22 23 156 118 387 1.08% 
4 1 135 15 52 214 206 623 1.75% 
5 8 6 8 38 70 114 244 0.68% 
6 0 7 17 43 104 162 333 0.93% 
7 0 0 2 11 22 45 80 0.22% 
Total 1,493 7,314 953 16,191 5,470 4,270 35,691 100.00% 
 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
Table A3b Rank Distribution by Sub-periods 
 
Rank Pre 1400 
1400-
1499 
1500-
1599 
1600-
1699 
1700-
1799 
1800-
1899 
Post 
1900 Total 
1 102 373 1,327 4,334 11,621 13,578 922 32,257 
2 12 11 20 37 117 34 0 231 
3 0 4 73 125 115 67 0 384 
4 1 5 14 115 331 148 0 614 
5 0 5 19 32 109 78 0 243 
6 10 12 11 63 156 79 0 331 
7 4 9 8 30 26 3 0 80 
Total 129 419 1,472 4,736 12,475 13,987 922 34,140 
 
Note: 34,140 of 35,691 males could be identified with birth cohorts. 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
Table A4 Lineage Distribution by Sub-periods 
 
Lineage Pre 1400 
1400-
1499 
1500-
1599 
1600-
1699 
1700-
1799 
1800-
1899 
Post 
1900 Total 
Huang 3 32 143 301 669 313 0 1,461 
Que 31 62 264 949 1952 3,110 819 7,187 
Zhou 75 157 178 38 130 278 76 932 
Gu 9 112 538      1,624      5,088 7,460 0 14,831 
Zha 9 46 285 1,183 2,449 1,466 27 5,465 
Zhuang 2 10 64 641 2,187 1,360 0 4,264 
Total 129 419 1,472 4,736 12,475 13,987 922 34,140 
 
Source: The lineage sample. 
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Table A5 Zero Counts of Number of Marriages and Number of Sons by Lineage 
 
Lineage 
N Total 
N 
Unmarried 
males 
N Heirless 
males 
% 
Unmarried 
males 
% Heirless 
males 
% Heirless 
married 
males 
Huang 1,493 677 843 45.34% 56.46% 20.34% 
Que 7,314 2,698 3,283 36.89% 44.89% 12.69% 
Zhou 953 334 476 35.05% 49.95% 22.94% 
Gu 16,191 3,992 6,777 24.66% 41.86% 22.83% 
Zha 5,470 1,563 2,494 28.57% 45.59% 23.85% 
Zhuang 4,270 1,302 1,872 30.49% 43.84% 19.20% 
 
Source: The lineage sample. 
 
 
Table A6a Number of Sons by Social Rank 
 
 N 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum % Heirless 
Rank 1   33,793  1.073 1.315 0 10 45.89% 
Rank 2 231  2.039 1.384 0 6 14.72% 
Rank 3 387  2.111 1.546 0 8 12.40% 
Rank 4   623  2.199 1.654 0 9 13.48% 
Rank 5 244  1.836 1.399 0 8 15.57% 
Rank 6 333  2.297 1.693 0 10 9.01% 
Rank 7 80  3.375 2.467 0 13 5.00% 
Total 35,691  1.132 1.358 0 13 44.11% 
 
 
Table A6b Number of Marriages by Social Rank 
 
 N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
% 
Unmarried 
Rank 1   33,793 0.769 0.600 0 5 31.16% 
Rank 2 231 1.281 0.668 0 3 6.49% 
Rank 3 387 1.357 0.681 0 4 1.29% 
Rank 4   623 1.371 0.670 0 4 1.28% 
Rank 5 244 1.365 0.668 0 4 2.46% 
Rank 6 333 1.631 0.911 0 6 0.60% 
Rank 7 80 1.938 1.470 1 10 0.00% 
Total 35,691 0.804 0.631 0 10 29.60% 
 
Note: 1. The number of marriages is the total number of marriages, including both wives and 
concubines. 2. The number of males also includes men who died before adulthood. 
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Table A7 Recorded Number of Sons by Status 
 
 N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Huang Lineage    
Non-gentry   1,477 1.060 1.542 
Near-gentry 5 2 1.871 
Gentry 11 2.636 1.362 
All 1,566 1.025 1.528 
Que Lineage    
Non-gentry   7,092 1.304 1.613 
Near-gentry 8 2.625 1.996 
Gentry 214 3.121 1.811 
All 7,314 1.358 1.649 
Zhou Lineage    
Non-gentry   816 0.868 1.227 
Near-gentry 73 2.164 1.375 
Gentry 64 2.156 1.417 
All 953 1.054 1.331 
Gu Lineage    
Non-gentry   15,951 1.041 1.178 
Near-gentry 73 2.055 1.224 
Gentry 167 2.072 1.479 
All 16,191 1.056 1.188 
Zha Lineage    
Non-gentry   4,861 0.976 1.228 
Near-gentry 43 1.674 1.507 
Gentry 566 2.037 1.468 
All 5,470 1.091 1.299 
Zhuang Lineage    
Non-gentry   3,596 0.939 1.207 
Near-gentry 29 2.069 1.334 
Gentry 645 2.071 1.781 
All 4,270 1.118 1.374 
 
Note: “Non-gentry” denotes rank 1, “near-gentry” denotes rank 2, and “gentry” denotes ranks 3 
to 7. 
Source: The Lineage sample. 
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Appendix B. Robustness checks 
 
 
B.1 Lifespan 
Table B1 Summary Statistics of variables in Robustness checks 
 
Statistics N Mean Std. Min Max 
Age 11,210 49.951 17.597 1 105 
Age-squared 11,210 2804.715 1740.665 1 11025 
Number of brothers 35,691 2.706 1.489 1 13 
Father social rank 35,691 1.306 1.041 1 7 
Status 35,691 1.230 1.190 1 12 
Difference in sons 25,478 -0.008 1.757 -9 11 
Difference in ranks 25,478 0.007 0.852 -6 6 
 
 
B.2 Father impacts and family background 
Table B2 Negative binomial regression of number of sons of males with age 
records 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rank 2 1.219*** 
(0.059) 
1.093* 
(0.055) 
1.089* 
(0.054) 
Rank 3 1.276*** 
(0.050) 
1.075* 
(0.043) 
1.078* 
(0.043) 
Rank 4 1.371*** 
(0.045) 
1.138*** 
(0.039) 
1.141*** 
(0.039) 
Rank 5 1.242*** 
(0.072) 
1.040 
(0.058) 
1.020 
(0.056) 
Rank 6 1.427*** 
(0.071) 
1.057 
(0.055) 
1.055 
(0.054) 
Rank 7 1.758*** 
(0.160) 
1.129 
(0.115) 
1.129 
(0.112) 
Age 1.103*** 
(0.004) 
1.096*** 
(0.004) 
 
Age-squared  0.999*** 
(0.000) 
0.999*** 
(0.000) 
 
Age group 15-19   0.174*** 
(0.051) 
Age group 25-29   1.988*** 
(0.195) 
Age group 30-34   3.074*** 
(0.285) 
Age group 35-39   3.959*** 
(0.354) 
Age group 40-44   4.219*** 
(0.373) 
Age group 45-49   5.231*** 
(0.459) 
Age group 50-54   5.194*** 
65 
 
(0.455) 
Age group 55-59   5.608*** 
(0.491) 
Age group 60-64   5.509*** 
(0.482) 
Age group 65+   5.572*** 
(0.481) 
Marriages  1.304*** 
(0.021) 
1.293*** 
(0.020) 
Zi  1.064*** 
(0.023) 
1.065*** 
(0.023) 
Hao  1.192*** 
(0.030) 
1.188*** 
(0.030) 
Controls    
Firstborn N Y Y 
Out-migration N Y Y 
Birth cohort Y Y Y 
Lineage Y Y Y 
 
Constant 0.120*** 
(0.014) 
0.103*** 
(0.015) 
0.347*** 
(0.051) 
N 11,210 11,210 10,976 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.099 0.105 
 
Note: 1. Males who died after age 15 were selected into this sub-sample. 2. Rank 1 is the 
reference group. Age group 20-24 is the reference group in column (3). 3. The coefficients in the 
table are incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial model. 4. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 5. Birth cohort FE in this regression is a set of 50-year intervals. 6.*p<0.1; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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B.3 Alternative classification of social status 
Table B3a Effects of Fathers on the Recorded Number of Sons, Negative Binomial 
Regression 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rank 2  1.735*** 
(0.087) 
1.137** 
(0.065) 
Rank 3  1.686*** 
(0.070) 
1.060 
(0.049) 
Rank 4  1.905*** 
(0.066) 
1.147*** 
(0.045) 
Rank 5  1.884*** 
(0.105) 
1.082 
(0.063) 
Rank 6  2.245*** 
(0.105) 
1.065 
(0.065) 
Rank 7  2.880*** 
(0.313) 
1.138 
(0.141) 
NBrothers 1.017*** 
(0.005) 
1.016*** 
(0.004) 
1.013*** 
(0.005) 
Father    
    Rank 2 1.456*** 
(0.072) 
1.290*** 
(0.065) 
1.044 
(0.054) 
    Rank 3 1.436*** 
(0.057) 
1.228*** 
(0.050) 
1.090** 
(0.043) 
    Rank 4 1.493*** 
(0.047) 
1.227*** 
(0.041) 
1.077** 
(0.034) 
    Rank 5 1.209*** 
(0.073) 
0.925 
(0.057) 
0.866** 
(0.057) 
    Rank 6 1.272*** 
(0.060) 
0.869*** 
(0.041) 
0.811*** 
(0.040) 
    Rank 7 1.850*** 
(0.114) 
1.049 
(0.067) 
0.921 
(0.065) 
Marriages   2.169*** 
(0.032) 
Zi   1.229*** 
(0.018) 
Hao   1.190*** 
(0.029) 
Controls    
Firstborn N N Y 
Out-migration N N Y 
Survival N N Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y 
Constant 1.473*** 
(0.111) 
1.385*** 
(0.105) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
N 34,140 34,140 34,140 
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.042 0.150 
 
Note: 1. Rank 1 is the reference group. 2. The coefficients in the table are incidence rate ratios 
(IRR) for the negative binomial model. 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 4. *p<0.1; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
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Table B3b Effects of Differences in Attained Social Ranks on Differences in Net 
Fertility between Brothers, OLS regression. 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Difference in number of sons between brothers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rank difference    
= -1 -0.394** 
(0.179) 
-0.369** 
(0.179) 
-0.407** 
(0.175) 
= -2 -0.412** 
(0.163) 
-0.412** 
(0.165) 
-0.444*** 
(0.167) 
= -3 -1.049*** 
(0.162) 
-1.033*** 
(0.162) 
-1.066*** 
(0.162) 
= -4 -0.226 
(0.194) 
-0.218 
(0.195) 
-0.239 
(0.199) 
= -5 -0.843*** 
(0.243) 
-0.854*** 
(0.247) 
-0.812*** 
(0.250) 
= -6 -1.351*** 
(0.468) 
-1.356*** 
(0.474) 
-1.533*** 
(0.518) 
= 1 0.499*** 
(0.138) 
0.528*** 
(0.140) 
0.547*** 
(0.140) 
= 2 0.506*** 
(0.163) 
0.510*** 
(0.159) 
0.519*** 
(0.153) 
= 3 0.964*** 
(0.145) 
0.977*** 
(0.147) 
0.947*** 
(0.150) 
= 4 0.813*** 
(0.175) 
0.812*** 
(0.175) 
0.793*** 
(0.179) 
= 5 1.609*** 
(0.218) 
1.632*** 
(0.222) 
1.620*** 
(0.245) 
= 6 2.684** 
(1.159) 
2.693** 
(1.167) 
2.689** 
(1.187) 
Controls    
Father ranks Y N Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y 
Constant -0.001 
(0.230) 
-0.075 
(0.261) 
-0.058 
(0.261) 
N 24,594 24,632 24,594 
R-squared 0.019 0.020 0.021 
 
Notes: 1. Rank difference=0 is the reference group. 2. The coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are 
incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the Poisson model and the negative binomial model. 3. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered on fathers (8,445 clusters). 4. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
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B.4 Marriages as an ordinal variable 
Table B4 Alternative Classification of Social Status 
 
Status Count Percent Description 
1 33,793 94.68% No status; honoured by later generations with poems or prose 
discourses 
2 188 0.53% Literate and educated but without degree (teacher of the 
village or editor of genealogical books); lineage chief; donor 
to the lineage and the county 
3 487 1.36% Lower degree holder (normal shengyuan and civil 
shengyuan) 
4 522 1.46% Students at the Imperial Academy (lower degree) 
5 34 0.10% Intermediate/high degree holder (juren, gongsheng, jinshi), 
but no official position  
6 64 0.18% Awarded by the emperor with official titles, with no 
academic degree  
7 119 0.33% Prospective officials (houbu) 
8 91 0.25% Clerks (wei’ruliu); the lowest-ranking official (cong jiupin), 
with no degree 
9 106 0.30% Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking court 
official, with no academic degree record or normal and civil 
shengyuan degree 
10 128 0.36% Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking court 
official, with degree of studentship at the Imperial Academy 
11 82 0.23% Low-/medium-ranking local official and low-ranking court 
official, with intermediate/high degree 
12 77 0.22% High-ranking local official and medium/high-ranking court 
official 
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Table B5 Effects of Status on the Recorded Number of Sons, Negative Binomial 
Regression 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Status 2 1.899*** 
(0.096) 
1.881*** 
(0.106) 
1.481*** 
(0.081) 
1.135** 
(0.073) 
Status 3 1.996*** 
(0.068) 
1.859*** 
(0.068) 
1.398*** 
(0.050) 
1.097** 
(0.044) 
Status 4 2.039*** 
(0.069) 
2.000*** 
(0.070) 
1.513*** 
(0.054) 
1.122*** 
(0.047) 
Status 5 1.782*** 
(0.228) 
1.689*** 
(0.223) 
1.323** 
(0.171) 
0.962 
(0.154) 
Status 6 2.156*** 
(0.181) 
1.971*** 
(0.180) 
1.524*** 
(0.140) 
1.273** 
(0.142) 
Status 7 1.496*** 
(0.118) 
1.805*** 
(0.149) 
1.263*** 
(0.101) 
0.952 
(0.073) 
Status 8 1.782*** 
(0.120) 
1.963*** 
(0.150) 
1.464*** 
(0.106) 
1.048 
(0.092) 
Status 9  1.891*** 
(0.152) 
2.014*** 
(0.162) 
1.541*** 
(0.118) 
1.048 
(0.109) 
Status 10 2.483*** 
(0.161) 
2.582*** 
(0.169) 
1.781*** 
(0.120) 
1.009 
(0.098) 
Status 11 2.092*** 
(0.130) 
2.190*** 
(0.152) 
1.559*** 
(0.114) 
1.048 
(0.107) 
Status 12 3.087*** 
(0.260) 
2.801*** 
(0.287) 
1.927*** 
(0.205) 
0.999 
(0.129) 
Marriages    2.175*** 
(0.032) 
Zi   1.389*** 
(0.020) 
1.234*** 
(0.018) 
Hao   1.353*** 
(0.031) 
1.194*** 
(0.029) 
Controls     
Zi N N Y Y 
Hao N N Y Y 
Firstborn N N Y Y 
Out-migration N N Y Y 
Survival N N Y Y 
Birth cohort  N Y Y Y 
Lineage  N Y Y Y 
Constant 1.073*** 
(0.007) 
1.422*** 
(0.107) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
N 35,691 34,140 34,140 34,140 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.041 0.093 0.151 
 
Note: 1. Status 1 (commoners) is the reference group. 2. The coefficients in the table are 
incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the negative binomial model. 3. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 4.*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table B6 Wife Groups and Distribution 
 
Wife 
groups 
Number of 
marriages 
N % 
0 0 10,566 29.60 
1 1 22,105 61.93 
2 2 2,575 7.21 
3 3 366 1.03 
4 >4 79 0.22 
Total  35,691 100.00 
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Table B7 Effects of Rank and Wife on the Recorded Number of Sons, OLS and 
Negative Binomial Regression 
 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Sons 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Negative Binomial 
 
Negative Binomial 
(Married males) 
Rank 2 0.398*** 
(0.086) 
1.232*** 
 (0.053) 
1.232*** 
 (0.060) 
Rank 3 0.274*** 
(0.075) 
1.145*** 
 (0.041) 
1.145*** 
 (0.043) 
Rank 4 0.382*** 
(0.065) 
1.198*** 
 (0.037) 
1.198*** 
 (0.036) 
Rank 5 0.150* 
(0.085) 
1.121** 
 (0.053) 
1.121** 
 (0.055) 
Rank 6 0.463*** 
(0.090) 
1.291*** 
 (0.053) 
1.291*** 
 (0.052) 
Rank 7 1.246*** 
(0.264) 
1.611*** 
 (0.132) 
1.611*** 
 (0.105) 
Wife Group 0 -1.454*** 
(0.012) 
0.0003*** 
(0.000) 
 
Wife Group 2 0.238*** 
(0.030) 
1.144*** 
(0.018) 
1.144*** 
(0.018) 
Wife Group 3 0.499*** 
(0.086) 
1.251*** 
(0.047) 
1.251*** 
(0.045) 
Wife Group 4 1.145*** 
(0.256) 
1.528*** 
(0.125) 
1.528*** 
(0.100) 
Controls    
Zi Y Y Y 
Hao Y Y Y 
Firstborn Y Y Y 
Out-migration Y Y Y 
Survival Y Y Y 
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y 
Lineage FE Y Y Y 
Constant 1.910*** 
(0.098) 
0.234*** 
(0.039) 
0.235*** 
(0.043) 
N 34,140 34,140 23,884 
R-squared/Pseudo R2 0.357 0.261 0.043 
 
Note: 1. Rank 1 and wife group 1 are the reference groups. 2. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses in column. 3. The coefficients in column (2) and (3) are IRR. The coefficients in 
column (3) are incident rate ratios. 4. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
